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INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF STUDY
Since independence from the United Kingdom ("U.K.") in 1960,
Nigerians celebrate each of their exposures to democratic rule, free of
military intervention, with the appellation republic.' The Fourth
Republic, instituted in 1999, is the longest running such exposure to
democracy. 2
The extended period in democracy presents an
opportunity to systematically analyze the possibilities and constraints
of post-1999 judicial independence in Nigeria. This extended period in
democracy therefore provides the context for this article.

.www.ng.total.com/
of Nigeria, TOTAL,
1. See
The
History
01 about nigeria/0103_history.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2014). The practice is
redolent, for example, of the French people who adopt a similar formula. France is
now in its Fifth Republic, having been inaugurated by former military general
Charles de Gaulle in 1959. See, e.g., NICHOLAS ATKIN, THE FIFTH FRENCH

REPUBLIC (2005) (providing a political history of the French Fifth Republic); PHILIP
THODY, THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC: PRESIDENTS, POLITICS, AND PERSONALITIES

(1998) (discussing modem French history and politics, and focusing specifically on
five presidents from 1959 to 1998).
2. See History of Nigeria, supra note 1 (listing all four Republics with dates
and events associated with each Republic). Fourth implies the current republic is
preceded by three previous ones. See id. But that is not exactly true, given that there
are only two such Republics: the First from 1960 to 1966, and the Second from 1979
to 1983. See id. A Third Republic projected for 1993 became stillborn when the
military government under General Ibrahim Babaginda from 1985 to 1993 annulled
the presidential election that would have ushered in that republic. Id. Each of the
prior republics ended when the Nigerian military seized power for themselves after
overthrowing the affected civilian regime. See id. Nothing attests to the arbitrariness
of military rule better than the death of the Third Republic before it had a chance to
be born, despite the wealth of national resources invested preparing for that
Republic. See TRANSITION WITHOUT END: NIGERIAN POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

UNDER BABANGIDA (Larry Diamond et al., eds. 1997) (examining the rise and fall of
democratic transition and economic structural adjustment program in Nigeria during
the regime of General Babangida). To appreciate the level of constitutional and
institutional damage the failed transition to democracy represented, the seventeenmember Political Bureau, responsible for providing recommendations for
restructuring the country's political order in readiness for the Third Republic, "met
149 times, visited all the 301 local government areas in the country, and received a
total of 27,324 contributions, among them 14,961 memoranda, 1,723 recorded
cassettes and video tapes and 3,933 newspaper articles." Larry Diamond, Nigeria:
Pluralism,Statism, and the Strugglefor Democracy, 2 DEMOCRACY INDEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: AFRICA 90 n.109 (1998).
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A judicial tribunal's independence breathes life into the liberties
guaranteed for citizens in a national constitution,3 and promotes
human rights.4 It is also imperative for rooting the culture of the rule
of law, 5 as well as necessary for political and economic progress in
Nigeria and other African countries. 6 In a nutshell, "judges are
3. See Linda C. Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection
around the World, 85 JUDICATURE 195, 195 (2002) (singling out an independent
judiciary as "the indispensable link in the machinery for securing individual
protection against states' human rights abuses").
4. Id. Human rights are broad-ranging guarantees right-holders (individuals
and groups alike) need for a life of self-dignity that modem governments are
specially obligated to safeguard, rather than alienate, for their citizens. See JACK
DONNELLY,

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS

22 (4th ed.

2012)

(anchoring

justification for human rights on "the requirement that the state treat each person
with equal concern and respect," consistent with the precepts of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948). They are back-up claims against the government and society
that right-holders hope that they do not use, see id. at 20 (contending that "[t]o assert
one's human rights is to attempt to change political practices ... so that it will no
longer be necessary to claim those rights as human rights"), but which claims
assume particular urgency in Nigeria and other African countries precisely because
of the widespread abuses of these rights that occur in these lands. See, e.g., FRANS
VILJOEN & CHIDI ODNKALU, THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT
IN THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: A HANDBOOK FOR VICTIMS AND THEIR

ADVOCATES (2006) (helping advocates, lawyers, and victims of torture to develop
effective litigation strategies regarding violations of torture and related mistreatment
under the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("ACHPR")).
Constitutional instruments, such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence, take the
view, drawing on the natural-rights doctrine of the British philosopher John Locke,
that "governments are instituted among men" solely to protect these rights. See
Philip C. Aka, review of CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES FOR SUDAN (Lutz Oette, ed. 2011), 59 AFRICA

TODAY 131, 134-36 n.1 (2013). The UDHR embodies a succinct statement of these
rights, which are subsequently elaborated by various multilateral human rights
treaties. See DONNELLY, supra, at 7.

5. An independent judiciary is a key element of any system built on the rule of
law. See Anthony M. Kennedy, Keynote Address at the Annual Conference of the
American Bar Association (Aug. 5, 2006), http://www.c-span.org/video/?1937571/justice-kennedy-address (stating that in a system based on the rule of law, "[t]he
Law rests upon known, general principles applicable on equal terms to all persons. It
follows that the Law is superior to, and thus binds, the government and all of its
officials").
6. See John Mukum Mbaku, Providinga Foundationfor Wealth Creationand
Development in Africa: The Role of the Rule of Law, 38 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 959
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charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties
and property of citizens" that, without judicial independence, they
have little chance of discharging effectively.7 In many polities,
including Nigeria, the judiciary complements and completes the
political system. 8 It checks the government through judicial review,9
settles disputes between individuals and groups, and interprets the
laws, beginning with the constitution as the ultimate law.1 o Judicial
(2013) (contending that inculcating a culture of the rule of law is the basis for
political and economic development in Africa). See also JENNIFER A. WIDNER,
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AFRICA (2001) (making a similar argument as Professor Mbaku in

a work that explicitly links the rule of law and judicial independence, drawing on the
life and career of Francis Nyalali, Chief Justice of Tanzania from 1977 to 2000).
7. See Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Preamble, U.N.
Human Rights Commission Res.'s 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985) and 40/146 (Dec. 13,
1985),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Independencefudi
ciary.aspx [hereinafter Basic Principles on Judicial Independence] (The principles
were "[a]dopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan" from August 26 to September
6, 1985 "and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November
1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985.").
8. For elaboration of the concept of the political system, see DAVID EASTON, A
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965) (applying a systems theory to the

study of political science, based on the five-fold scheme of input, conversion,
output, feedback, and environment).
9. See BARBARA BARDES ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

TODAY: ESSENTIALS 2011-2012 ED. 456 (16th ed. 2011) (pointing out that in the
U.S. the power of judicial review "enables the judicial branch to act as a check on
the other two branches of government, in line with the system of checks and
balances established by the U.S. Constitution"). Key features of this system in the
U.S. include a president and legislature (Congress) elected separately; lawmaking
based on a balance of congressional and presidential powers; a Supreme Court
imbued with the power of judicial review that may strike down laws as
unconstitutional, meaning they may not be enforced; and the president, the
legislature, and the states together being able to override decisions of the Supreme
Court. See MICHAEL J. SODARO, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: A GLOBAL INTRODUCTION

194-96 (3d. ed. 2008). Nigeria has operated a presidential system of government,
patterned on the U.S., in-between military rules, since 1979. See Nigeria: Past,
Present, and the Future, EMBASSY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,
WASHINGTON, D.C., http://www.nigeriaembassyusa.org/index.php?page=nigeriapast-present-and-future (last visited Dec. 6, 2014).
10. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955) (analyzing the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land). Adding a needed economic spin to this concept,
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independence is the key for effective performance of these and other
judicial functions."
This article coincides with growing concerns regarding the
performance of the judiciary, which many commentators consider
mixed, 12 at a time when the face of the Nigerian court system is
constitutional economists, such as James M. Buchanan, maintain that a constitution
in its capacity as higher law, intended for use by generations of citizens, must be
amenable and adjustable for pragmatic decisions. See James M. Buchanan, The
Domain of Constitutional Economics, 1 CONST'L POL. ECONOMY 1-18 (1990)
(explaining constitutional political economy, in the work's abstract, as a "research
program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rule, and institutions within
which individuals interact"); James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic
Policy, reprinted in 77 AM. ECON. REv. 243-50 (1987) (statement on constitutional
political economy in 1986 while accepting his Nobel Prize honor in economics).
Given that politicians and bureaucrats charged with responsibility for upholding the
public interest ironically often seek their own self-interests, Buchanan and other
constitutional economists prefer interventions into and control of the economy that
will not profoundly and perversely affect the social and economic life of individuals.
Id. Buchanan is a noted apostle of public choice theory, which advocates the
application of economic thinking to traditional problems of political science. See
Robert D. McFadden, James M Buchanan, Economic Scholar and Nobel Laureate,
Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/10/
business/economy/james-m-buchananeconomic-scholar-dies-at-93.html.
He
theorized that pursuit of self-interest by modern politicians often leads to harmful
results. Id. For example, to court and appease voters during election times,
politicians will approve tax cuts and spending increases for projects and entitlements
that the electorate favors. Id. However, such outlays can lead to ever-rising deficits,
huge public debt burdens, not to mention big governments. Id. John Maynard
Keynes argued that budget deficits sometimes may be unavoidable and at times even
desirable during fiscal emergencies as a means to increase spending, create jobs, and
cut unemployment. Id. However, Buchanan pointed out that it is that kind of
reasoning that allowed politicians to rationalize the seemingly never-ending deficit
spending that characterizes many economies today. Id.

11. See infra Part I.
12. A sample of these critical works, popular and academic, include: Rotimi T.
Suberu, The Supreme Court and Federalism in Nigeria, 46 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD
451, 451-85 (2008) (focusing on a set of 15 cases decided by the Supreme Court up
to 2007); Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in TransitionalSocieties: An Analysis of
the Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT' L 9. 11-82
(2005) (commenting on the "problems and failures" of the Nigerian judiciary); Joel
Nwokeoma, Nigerian Judiciary as Temple of Corruption, THE WILL (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://thewillnigeria.com/opinion/5331 -Nigerian-Judiciciary-Temple-Corruption
(last visited Dec. 7, 2014) (ruefully positing that the judiciary has not lived up its
role as "bulwark" against corruption); Jiti Ogunye, A New Nigerian Judiciary is
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Even in its present format, Nigeria's current constitution

contains ample guarantees for judicial independence, including
protections coming from the agencies linked to judicial
independence. 14 The reality though is that in many respects, the
Nigerian judiciary lacks much needed independence.' 5 Consistent
with injunctions suggested in the U.N.'s Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary, Nigeria has made some important
strides in the application of constitutional guarantees relating to
judicial independence under the Fourth Republic.' 6 Nevertheless, the
government has yet "to translate [these principles] fully into reality."' 7
Thus, while constitutional provisions for judicial independence are
important, ultimately, those guarantees of protection, no matter how
ample, will be inadequate unless the masses resolve to fight for
judicial independence.
In tackling the problem of judicial
independence in Nigeria, this article takes a necessarily comparative
approach that draws on lessons from other countries,' 8 particularly the
Necessary, SAHARA REPORTERS (Oct. 3, 2011), http://saharareporters.
tumblr.com/post/ 11023892224/a-new-nigerian-judiciary-is-necessary-by-jiti
(proposing a complete overhaul of the Nigerian judiciary).
13. See infra Part IV. (analyzing two forces of Nigerian politics since 1999
with potential implications for judicial independence).
14. See infra Appendix B. (identifying institutions connected with judicial
independence in Nigeria).
15. See infra Part III. (analyzing judicial independence under the Fourth
Republic).
16. Id.
17. See Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7 (indicating
that "the organization and administration of justice in every country should be
inspired by [principles revolved around the right to a fair and public hearing], and
efforts should be undertaken to translate them fully into reality").
18. A well-known adage of comparative politics, drawn from the wisdom of
the British author and poet Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), is that a researcher knows
England not, who draws all of his or her insights exclusively from England.
SODARO, supra note 9, at 28. This wisdom, joined by Nigeria's enamor of the U.S.
political system, indicated in the next footnote, justifies the comparative perspective
this article adopts. From a methodological standpoint, the technique utilized in this
study combines the most-similar-systems design and within-case comparison. J.
TYLER

DICKOVICK

&

JONATHAN

EASTWOOD,

COMPARATIVE

POLITICS:

INTEGRATING THEORIES, METHODS, AND CASES 14-17, 19 (2013) (describing the

features of the two research designs). In the first, the logic is that "two cases (such
as two countries) that are similar in a variety of ways would be expected to have
very similar political outcomes." Id. at 14. In the second, "the researcher look[s]

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol45/iss1/2
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United States ("U.S."), whose presidential system of government was
adopted by Nigeria in 1979.19
Part I. of this article provides a comprehensive definition of
judicial independence. This definition takes some of its reference
points from the United States, consistent with the comparative tenor of
the piece. Part II. provides a brief historical background narrative,
from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial periods, necessary for proper
understanding of judicial independence in Nigeria. Part III. assesses
judicial independence under the Fourth Republic, using a variety of
measurements that include the seven indicators of judicial
independence distilled in Part I. and the U.S. Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights in Nigeria for 1999, 2003, 2012, and 2013,
years germane to the timeline from 1999 to the present at the cynosure
of this work. Part IV. spotlights two forces of Nigerian politics under
the Fourth Republic since 1999 with possible implications for judicial
independence. The two factors are the adoption of Islamic sharia law
as criminal code in twelve northern states in the country, and the
invigoration of the Economic Community of West African States'
("ECOWAS") Community Court of Justice. Lastly, Part V. identifies
and analyzes five practical steps for promoting increased judicial
independence in Nigeria, namely: maintaining civilian rule, support
from the political branches of the government, contribution of the
judiciary to its own independence, building judicial independence
with public participation (the theme central to the argument of the
article), and judicial reforms on several fronts.

more carefully within [his or her] own case(s) to examine the variations there ...
Looking at different moments in time or in space may allow us to dig deeper into a
case to better understand our evidence." Id. at 19. These two techniques are present
in this article.
19. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1979), Art. 5, § 1(a), available at
www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig-const_79.pdf (stipulating that the executive
powers of the Federation "shall be vested in the President, and may . .. be exercised
by him directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of
the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation"). Nigeria replaced
its parliamentary system of government that the country inherited from the U.K.
upon its independence in October 1960. Id.
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DEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Judicialindependence is the ability of a judicial tribunal, qualified
by law, to make decisions free of undue pressure from outside
sources, especially the executive and legislative branches of the
government.2 0 It is the freedom of judges in a judicial system to
"decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason." 21 Judicial independence
is present when individual judges have three types of independence:
personal, substantive, and internal. 22
Personal independence exists when "the terms and conditions of
judicial service are adequately secured so as to ensure that individual
judges are not subject to executive control." 23 Substantive
independence exists when "in the discharge of his/her judicial
function, a judge is subject to nothing but the law and the commands
of his/her conscience." 24 Internal independence occurs when "[i]n the
decision-making process, a judge must be independent vis-A-vis his
Of the three, internal
judicial colleagues and supporters." 25
independence is the most difficult to measure empirically, given the
secrecy that shrouds judicial decision making. For example, the Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed by the

United Nations, advises: "The judiciary shall be bound by professional
secrecy with regard to their deliberations and to confidential
information acquired in the course of their duties." 26

20.

LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, APPROACHING DEMOCRACY

188 (8th ed. 2013).
21.

Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 2.

22.

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION MINIMUM STANDARDS

OF JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE (Int'l Bar Assn. 1982), § 1(a), 46 (reprinted in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 388 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules

These three types of
Desch~nes, eds. 1985)) [hereinafter IBA MIN. STDS.].
independence are both non-mutually exclusive and interlinked. Id.
23. Id. § 1(b).
24. Id. § 1(c).
25. Id. § 47.
26. Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 15.
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There are two segments to the discussion in this section. The first
segment identifies and discusses the key constitutional indicators of
judicial independence, drawing on the pertinent documents related to
the topic. These include the Basic Principles on the Independence of
the Judiciary, referred to in the last paragraph, and the International
Bar Association's ("IBA") Minimum Standards of Judicial
Independence. The second segment elaborates on three important
issues presented by the definition of judicial independence set forth
above, and where necessary, uses the United States as baseline. The
reference to the U.S. benefits the reader who is unfamiliar with the
Nigerian legal and political system. It is also consistent with the
comparative import of this article, including recognition of Nigeria's
enamor of the U.S. system down to the adoption of the presidential
system of government as a replacement for the parliamentary system
that it inherited from the U.K. in 1960.
A. Key Indicatorsof JudicialIndependence
The seven key indicators of judicial independence are: the ban
against exceptional or military courts, separation of powers, exclusive
authority, finality of decisions, enumerated qualifications, guaranteed
terms, and fiscal autonomy. 27
The first indicator is the ban against exceptional or military
courts.28 As the name indicates, this measure forbids citizens from
being tried in extraordinary tribunals. 29 Instead, as the Basic
Principles on Judicial Independence put it, "[e]very one shall have the
right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal
procedures." 30 More specifically, "[t]ribunals that do not use the duly
established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to
displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial
tribunals." 31 International human rights instruments, including the
27. See Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7; IBA MIN.
STDS., supra note 22; Keith, supra note 3, at 196-97.
28. Keith, supra note 3, at 196-97.
29. See id.
30. Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 5.
31. Id. (emphasis added) (reciting the right of individuals, under the UDHR,
"to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal
established by law").
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ones that Nigeria is a party-state to, also provide this right.3 2 More
than any other measure, this indicator is the testament that the people,

rather than solely judges, are the ultimate beneficiaries of judicial
independence.33
The second indicator of judicial independence is separation of
powers, which requires that the authority of the judicial branch be
32. Human rights instruments Nigeria ratified from 1960 to 2012, along with
the year each treaty was ratified, include the following: the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1993); the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") (1993); the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1967); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1985); Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(2001); Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2009); International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2009); Convention
on the Rights of the Child (1991); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts (2012); Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1968); Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (2011); Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (2009); all the Geneva
Conventions related the law of armed conflict, including protocols (various dates
from 1961 to 1988); Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (1970); Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (2001); among others. See Ratification of International
Human Rights Treaties-Nigeria, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, HUMAN RIGHTS
LIBRARY, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research /ratification-nigeria.html (last
visited Dec. 7, 2014). The author illustrates with three instruments: the UDHR, the
ICCPR, and the ACHPR. The UDHR provides that "[e]veryone has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 8 (emphasis added). The ICCPR provides that "[e]veryone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and
impartial tribunal established by law." ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 14(1) (1966) (emphasis added).
Finally, the ACHPR provides that "[e]very individual shall have the right to have his
cause heard," including "the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a
competent court or tribunal." ACHPR, 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 7 (Oct. 21, 1986) (emphasis
added).
33. See infra Part V.D. (discussing building independence with popular
participation). See also Shirley S. Abrahamson, Speech: The Ballot and the Bench,
76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 973, 982 (opining that judicial independence protects the people,
not judges).
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formally separated from the authority of the executive and legislative
branches, who must also refrain from taking any steps likely to
endanger the independence of judges. 34 This is obviously what the
Basic Principles on Judicial Independence meant when it
recommended that judicial independence "be guaranteed by the State
and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country." 35 The
idea behind this formal separation is to insulate the judiciary from
possible arbitrary abuses by other branches of government through the
grant of powers embedded in a constitution that those other branches
cannot easily take away. 36 The question this indicator invokes is
whether courts are housed in a branch separate from the executive and
legislative branches. 37
The third indicator is exclusive authority, which requires that
courts have the exclusive authority to decide cases based on their own
competence and free from unwarranted pressures of any type.3 1 In the
language of the Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, "[tihe
judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature and
shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for
its decision is within its competence as defined by law."3 9 This is a
measurement related to the fourth indicator, finality of decision,
designed with a similar purpose in mind: safeguarding the ability of
judges to carry out judicial functions free of undue interventions from
other state actors. 40
Fourth, the finality of decisions indicator mandates that the
decisions of judges not be subject to any revision outside the appeal
procedures provided by law.41 In the language of the Basic Principles
on Judicial Independence, "[tjhere shall not be any inappropriate or
unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial
decisions by the courts be subject to revision." 42 The idea behind this
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Keith, supra note 3, at 197.
Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 1.
Keith, supra note 3, at 197.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 3.
Keith, supra note 3, at 196.
Id.
Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 4.
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measure, as indicated in the third indicator, is to safeguard the ability

of judges to carry out their judicial functions fully and free of undue
interventions from other state actors.4 3
Enumerated qualifications, as the fifth indicator, stands for the
idea that the selection of judges should be based on merit factors, such

as professional qualifications, ability, and integrity.44
Where
necessary, it should also be decided by an authority independent of the
government. 4 5 The IBA Minimum Standards on this issue provide
that "[p]articipation in judicial appointments and promotions by the
executive or legislature is not inconsistent with judicial independence,
provided that appointments and promotions of judges are vested in a
judicial body in which members of the judiciary and the legal
profession form a majority." 46 The idea behind this measure is to
produce judges able to perform their functions competently, and who
have been socialized to the norms of judicial independence.4 ' This
occurrence renders them more able to counter encroachments on
citizens' liberties from other branches. 48
Under the sixth indicator, guaranteed terms, the constitution
guarantees judges' terms of office, governing their appointment,
discipline, and removal from office. 49 This is consistent with the
directive of the JBA that "[t]he position of the judges, their
independence, their security, and their adequate remuneration shall be
43. Keith, supra note 3, at 196.
44. Id. at 197.
45. Id. The qualifier "where necessary" is added because the IBA Minimum
Standards provide that "[a]ppointments and promotions by a non-judicial body will
not be considered inconsistent with judicial independence in countries where, by
long historic and democratic tradition,judicial appointments andpromotion operate
satisfactorily." IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 3(b) (emphasis added). However,
Nigeria does not rank among these countries with democratic traditions where
judicial recruitments operate satisfactorily. See infra Part V.A. (commaPting on the
necessity for continued civilian rule as a step toward increased judicial
independence in the country).
46. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 3(a).
47. Keith, supra note 3, at 197.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 196; Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, §§ 10,
11-14, 17-20 (covering the qualifications, selection and training; conditions of
service and tenure; and discipline, suspension and removal of judges); IBA MIN.
STDS., supra note 22, §§ 22-32.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol45/iss1/2

14

Aka: Judicial Independence under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Problems

14

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

secured by law,"50 and judicial salaries not "be decreased during the
judges' services, except as a coherent part of an overall public
economic measure." 5 ' The goals of this measure are two-fold: to
protect judges from possible personal and professional retribution
from the other branches of government, and to minimize other
improper influences that might interfere with judicial impartiality. 52
Fiscal autonomy is the last of the indicators of judicial
independence, and exists when a judiciary is provided with adequate
resources allowing it to properly perform its functions while insulating
it from possible financial retribution of an abusive regime. 53 This
indicator is met when the salaries and/or budgets of the judiciary are
protected from reduction by the other political branches. 54
B. Three Extrapolationsfrom the Definition ofJudicialIndependence
in this Article
The goal in this sub-section is to address extrapolations from the
preceding definition of judicial independence. There are three of these
extrapolations: first, not all tribunals are bestowed with independence;
second, the feature (or attribute) comes from a "higher" source, such
as a constitutional document; and third, some pressures from external
sources are constitutionally permissible, provided such pressures are
not undue, improper, or impermissible. The first of these
extrapolations is that in the United States, only Article III courts,
defined as judicial tribunals created under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, are clothe with the attribute of judicial independence. 5
At the national level, the U.S. courts include the district courts,
50. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 15(a).
51. Id. § 15(b).
52. Keith, supra note 3, at 196.
53. Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 7; Keith, supra
note 3, at 197.
54. Keith, supra note 3, at 197.
55. See U.S. CONST. (1789), art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). The attribute involved, to
state it upfront here, is life tenure and protection against diminishment of salary. See
id. ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.").
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excluding territorial courts created under Congressional powers of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution, circuit courts of appeal, and the U.S.
Supreme Court, which is the only court named in the Constitution.56
Articles I and II courts are judicial tribunals created under the
legislative power of Congress and the executive power of the
President (including his power as Commander-in-Chief of the military
forces).5 As one author noted, "[t]here are different meanings and
degrees of judicial independence, different forms of accountability,
and different balances between independence and judicial
accountability." 58 Accordingly, these courts enjoy a reduced level of
judicial independence, compared to those of Article III courts. 59

56. See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence, 95 GEO L.J.
965, 966-67 (2007) (indicating that Article III judges include U.S. Supreme Court
justices, judges of circuit courts of appeal, and judges of federal district courts; all of
these judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate and hold
office "during good Behaviour," among other features). Unlike the Supreme Court,
all the other courts are created by Congress. See U.S. CONST., supra note 55, art. III,
§ 1 (stating that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish") (emphasis added). The focus here is confined to the national
government, and does not include state courts, which in the United States, are
separate and independent of the national government. See BERMAN & MURPHY,
supra note 20, at 189 (observing that the U.S. judicial system "consists of two
separate and parallel court systems: an extensive system of state and local courts ...
and a system of national or federal courts").
57. Article I courts derive their authority from the powers given to Congress
under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, on a range of issues that include payment of
money owed by the U.S., taxation, regulation of the armed forces, and governance
of the District of Columbia and U.S. territories. Loren A. Smith & Gary Lawson, A
Note on Non-Article III Courts, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION,

www.heritage.org/constitution/#1/articles/3/essays/1 06/a-note-on-non-article-iiicourts (last visited on Dec. 7, 2014). These judicial tribunals include the Tax Court,
the Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of Veteran Appeals, among others. Id.
Article I judges lack life tenure and salary guarantees. Id. Article II courts,
comprising the largest category of federal adjudicators (several thousand organized
into hundreds of categories), are career employees of the executive branch. Id. Some
have special career tenure protection, others have tenure protection limited to the
civil service, while yet others are political appointees with no career protection. Id.
These judicial tribunals include military courts-martials, and military commissions.
Id.
58. Jackson, supra note 56, at 967.
59. See supra note 57, and corresponding text.
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Unlike the dual federal-state court systems that operate in the
U.S., Nigeria has a unified court system. Besides the structural
difference between the U.S. and Nigerian court systems, the two are
similar in many respects. Although unified, the Nigerian judicial
system is bifurcated into federal courts (including election tribunals),
and state courts. 60 The federal courts include the Supreme Court, with
both original and appellate jurisdiction, depending on the case; the
Court of Appeal, with mostly appellate jurisdiction but also original
jurisdiction in certain cases; and the Federal High Court, with
exclusive original jurisdiction in many cases. 6 1 The state courts
include the High Court, with unlimited jurisdictions in matters related
to the states; the Sharia Court of Appeal, with appellate jurisdiction in
matters of Islamic personal law; and the Customary Court of Appeal,
with appellate jurisdiction in matters of customary law. 62 The election
tribunals are for disputes regarding elections into the National
Assembly, the governorship, and state assemblies. 63 In addition, the
Federal Capital Territory at Abuja operates as a separate entity,
similar to the states; therefore, it is similarly outfitted with the same
three courts: High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal, and Customary
Court of Appeal.6 4
All of these federal and state courts, created by the Constitution,
are recognized as constitutional courts and distinguished from the
non-constitutional courts, which include customary courts, magistrate
courts, district courts, juvenile courts, and coroners courts. 65 Some
60. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), chap. VII, arts. 230-96 [hereinafter
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999)], available at www.nigeria-law.org/const
itutionofthefederalrepublicofnigeria.htm (dealing with the Judicature).

6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60,

§ 255 (establishing

the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory); id. § 256 (appointing the judges of
the Federal Capital Territory); id. § 260 (establishing the Sharia Court of Appeal of
the Federal Capital Territory); id. § 261 (appointing the judges of the Sharia Court
of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory); id. § 265 (establishing the Customary
Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory); id. § 266 (appointing the judges of
the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory).
65. Courts and Justice Administration in Nigeria, NATIONAL OPEN
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA 15 (2010), www.nou.edu.ng/NOUNOCL/pdf/pdf2/
CSS371.MAIN.pdf [hereinafter Courts and Justice Admin. in Nigeria]. In some
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writers refer to these latter courts as "inferior" courts.6 6 Without
denigrating or neglecting these tribunals, the focus in this article is on
the constitutional courts.
A second extrapolation, linked inextricably with the first,
regarding the definition of judicial independence in this article, is that
judicial independence is an attribute that the constitutional and legal
system bestows on a court. This is a point obvious from the foregoing
discussion on the organization of the court systems in the U.S. and
Nigeria. While recognizing the legal-constitutional element embedded
in the definition of judicial independence, one must at the same time
keep in view the politics that shape judicial independence. For
example, judicial review, a key component of judicial independence
and of the U.S.'s democracy, was not a power written into the U.S.
Constitution; instead, the Supreme Court recognized judicial review
for itself and for the U.S. legal and political system in a court case.6 7
But not all political events are healthy or beneficial for judicial
independence in a country. Nigeria is one case of that negative
parts of the country, these inferior courts also include justice of the peace which,
although not a court in the strict sense of the term, nevertheless plays an important
role in administration of justice. Id.
66. See id. at 9-20 (analyzing the "machinery of justice" in Nigeria, including
a discussion on inferior courts); see also Kehinde Adegbite, 6 Things Every
Nigerian Must Know about the Nigerian Law, Part 2, VANGUARD (Apr. 28, 2012,
9:42 AM), http://community.vanguardngr.com/profiles/blogs/6-things-that-everyknowledge,
(discussing
legal
nigerian-must-know-about-the-nigerian-law-I
including a categorization of superior and inferior courts).
67. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (recognizing judicial review by
default, by refusing to compel the handover of a commission on the ground that the
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling the petitioner to bring his claim to
the Supreme Court was unconstitutional). In his book on United States constitutional
law, John A. Garraty commented on how "constitutional questions of tremendous
significance often depend upon the actions of individuals unconcerned with large
legal

issues."

JOHN

A.

GARRATY,

QUARRELS

THAT

HAVE

SHAPED

THE

CONSTITUTION 3 (John A. Garraty ed., rev. ed. 1987). Marbury was such a decision
and deservedly one of the twenty lawsuits profiled in the book. Id. at 7-20
(spotlighting "[t]he Case of the Missing Commissions"). The judicial review role of
U.S. courts, especially the Supreme Court's, contradicts the notion of the U.S.
Constitution as "written," i.e., "found in one integrated volume rather than in
various, scattered, sources." Philip C. Aka, Foreword, in GLORIA J. BROWNEMARSHALL, THE CONSTITUTION: MAJOR CASES AND CONFLICT xii (3d. ed. 2011).

Instead, the U.S. Constitution comprises multiple sources, one of them being the
accumulated jurisprudence of U.S. courts, led by the Supreme Court. Id.
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example. Military rule in Nigeria, involving the exercise of political
powers, militated against judicial independence. 68
The third and final extrapolation from the definition of judicial
independence in this article is that only "undue" pressures on the
judiciary are constitutionally impermissible. 6 9 Pressures related to
checks and balances, which prevent the concentration of power in any
one official or branch of the government, are not constitutionally
"undue."o In other words, judicial independence does not mean that
the judiciary is "completely shielded from outside influences." 7 ' To
use the U.S. again as an example, Congress may impact the
independence of the judiciary through several means, including:
passing laws that overturn a Supreme Court's decision; abolishing
some or all lower federal courts or refusing to create new courts;
refusing to raise judicial salaries; removing certain classes of cases
from the appellate docket, in effect leaving lower-court rulings in
force; changing the number of justices on the Supreme Court;
impeaching a sitting justice; attacking the Court in speeches; and
filibustering judicial appointments. 72 Similarly, presidents can change
the direction of the Supreme Court with new appointments. 73

68. See infra Part V.A. (arguing for the maintenance of civilian rule as a step
for promoting increased judicial independence in Nigeria). See also Peter P. Ekeh,
Theory and Curse of Military Rule and the Transition Program, ASSOCIATION OF
NIGERIAN SCHOLARS FOR DIALOGUE
(Aug. 1, 1998), www.waado.org/
nigerian scholars/archive/opinion/theory.htm (listing the "curse" or negative
consequences of military rule in the country to include the negation of
constitutionalism and federalism).
69. See BERMAN & MURPHY, supra note 20, at 188.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Direction denotes the ability of the president to shape the composition
and the ideological coloration of the Supreme Court and other courts in the federal
judiciary, using his nomination powers under the U.S. Constitution. See BERMAN &
MURPHY, supra note 20, at 197-98 (analyzing the impact of presidential
appointments on the Supreme Court). See also Presidential Powers,
THISNATION.COM,

www.thisnation.com/textbook/

executive-power.html

(last

visited Dec. 12, 2014) (stating that through his appointment powers, the President
"plays a significant role in shaping the composition of the" federal judiciary, and
that by selecting appointees "with whom they share similar perspectives, Presidents
can influence the direction of judicial decisions far beyond their tenure in office").
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND HISTORY OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA

Present-day Nigeria is a multinational state with over 250 ethnic
groups, and with language groups that more than double that
number. 74 Three of the most numerous groups, which constitute about
two-thirds of the country's population, are the Igbo in the East, the
Yoruba in the West, and the Hausa-Fulani in the North.7 5 Each of
these groups has a population that runs into tens of millions. 76 Similar
to groups in other parts of Africa, many of the ethnic groups in
Nigeria had institutions that performed judicial functions.77 The
Hausa-Fulani had a highly centralized system centered on Emirs who
combined political and religious powers in a system characterized by
few checks and balances.7 8
In contrast, Igbo societies were
74. See

Nigeria,

ETHNOLOGUE:

LANGUAGES

OF

THE

WORLD,

http://www.ethnologue.com/country/NG (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (listing the
number of individual languages in the country as 527, of which 514 are living and
only eleven extinct). The numbers bear comparison to the United States, with a
population double the size of Nigeria, but that only has 227 individual languages, of
which 215 are living and twelve extinct. See United States of America,
ETHNOLOGUE, https://www.ethnologue.com/country/us (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
75. See A. Carl LeVan & Oladimeji Aborisade, Politics in Nigeria, in
COMPARATIVE POLITICS TODAY: A WORLD VIEW 631, 633-34 (G. Bingham Powell,

Jr. et al., eds., 11th ed. 2015) (describing "[t]he [e]ffect of [h]istory" in the evolution
of Nigeria); Diamond, supra note 2, at 33-34 (providing a "historical review" of the
country in the period before independence).
76. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 35 (citing census figures in the period
before and soon after independence).
77. See Samuel 0. Manteaw, Legal Education in Africa: What Type of Lawyer
Does Africa Need?, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 903, 911 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted) ("[T]raditional legal systems and customary laws in African
polyethnic societies formed part of a functioning, coherent, and consistent totality of
the African way of life."); Mojeed Olujinmi A. Alabi, Law Making in Pre-Colonial
Yorubaland, in THE YORUBA IN TRANSITION: HISTORY, VALUES, AND MODERNITY

111, 112 (Toyin Falola & Ann Genova, eds., 2006) (stating that pre-colonial Africa
was never in short supply of well-developed political institutions that promoted
stability for hundreds, if not thousands of years).
78. Oyediji 0. Babatunde, Hausa/Fulani Pre-Colonial Political System in
Nigeria, WORDPRESS
(Mar.
30,
2014),
http://www.profseunoyediji.
wordpress.com/2014/03/30/hausafulani-pre-colonial-political-system-in-nigeria
(characterizing the Emir as an "absolute ruler" who exercised his authority
unrestrained by any "principle of checks and balance").
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acephalous, or kingless communities, who organized themselves into
over two thousand villages, which were marked by decentralized
political powers. 7 9 "[M]onarchical and hierarchically structured and
centralized with some measure of republicanism," the Yoruba
represented a midpoint between the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo.80
The main focus of this article is on the post-colonial period,
starting in 1999 up to present time, but historical context that predates
the Fourth Republic is essential to understanding the main focus of
this article. Thus, the discussion that follows is conveniently divided
into three periods: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial.
A. Pre-ColonialPeriod
The expression pre-colonial supposes a unified entity, which is
lacking in the case of Nigeria because of the multi-ethnic character of
the country, as described above. As a result, the story of judicial
independence told in this subsection centers conveniently around the
three major ethnic groups in the country. Within these groups, as in
many African communities, conception of law and justice focused
heavily and ineluctably on religion and ethics.81
More specifically, contrasted from the western judicial system, in
these and other societies, judicial proceedings were a tool of social
control geared toward dispute reconciliation and maintaining peace,
order, and stability in the community. 82 And in these communities,
different entities performed judicial functions. Among the HausaFulani, it was the Emirs, who applied Islamic law with the assistance
of Alkalis, experts in Islamic law;83 among the Igbo, it was the elders

79. See ELIZABETH ISICHEL, THE IGBO PEOPLE AND THE EUROPEANS: THE
GENESIS OF A RELATIONSHIP-To 1906 47 (1973); ELIZABETH ISICHEi, A HISTORY
OF CHRISTIANITY IN AFRICA 155 (1995).

80. Alabi, supra note 77, at 112, 122.
81. MICHAEL
NKUZI
NNAM,
JURISPRUDENCE: A COMPARISON AND

ANGLO
AMERICAN
AND
NIGERIAN
CONTRAST IN LEGAL REASONING AND

CONCEPT OF LAW vii (1989).

82. Alabi, supra note 77, at 118.
83. Philip Ostien & Albert Dekker, Sharia and National Law in Nigeria, in
SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF

TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 555, 559 (Jan Michiel Otto, ed.

2010).
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in council or age-grades, who applied Igbo customary laws; 84 and

among the Yoruba, the Oba in Council applied Yoruba customary

law. 8' Given these features, it is fair to say that in many African
societies during the precolonial period, including the communities that
British colonial authorities banded together to form modem-day
Nigeria, the judiciary remained an inchoate part of the political system
in a manner that makes it hard to ascribe independence to whatever
institutions in these societies that performed the judicial role.
B. ColonialPeriod
During the colonial period in Nigeria, like in many African
societies, the judiciary was not a tool of social change.8 6 To the
contrary, it was one of the institutions the colonial authorities used to
maintain foreign rule. "[M]any colonial administrators had no better
understanding of the judicial function than to assist the administration
in ensuring peace, law, and order."8 7 Thus, in Nigeria, the judiciary
served as an executive tool "in the maintenance of law and order, the
creation of a conducive atmosphere for the development of commerce,
and the promotion of unequal economic relationship between the

84. See Manteaw, supra note 77, at 911; Alabi, supra note 77, at 112. Agegrades are a key feature of Igbo kingless communities. See Cyril A. Onwumechili,
The 2000 Ahiajoku Lecture, Igbo Enwe Eze: The Igbo Have no Kings, IGBONET,
ahiajoku.igbonet.com/2000/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2014). They are groups of men, of a
particular age group, usually a few years apart, "who function like standing
committees of the village assembly" to provide a range of social services that
include settlement of land and other disputes. Id.
85. See Alabi, supra note 77, passim. Customary laws are unwritten (meaning
un-codified) bodies of law, accepted norms of behavior, that evolved from the
custom of a particular people. Courts and Justice Admin. in Nigeria, supra note 65,
at 4. Many African ethnicity groups, including the Yoruba and the Igbo, have these
laws. See Manteaw, supra note 77, at 911.
86. See Akin Alao, Colonial Rule and Judicial Reforms, 1900-1960, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TOYIN FALOLA 201, 205 (Adebayo

Oyebade ed., 2003) (depicting provincial courts as "instrument[s] of legal control").
See also David Killingray, The Maintenance of Law and Order in British Colonial
Africa, 85 AFR. AFFAIRS 411, 415 (1986) (explaining that "Colonial governments
had an interest in maintaining a framework of law and order within which the basic
tasks of colonial administration could be carried out").
87. Alao, supra note 86, at 213.
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colony and Britain."88 The semblance of judicial reforms that took
place in the later period of colonial rule "emphasize[d] executive
justice rather than social justice." 89 Before 1914, in southern Nigeria,
during the colonial period, the entities that performed the judicial
function included, from lowest to highest tribunal: district courts,
divisional courts, and a supreme court. 90
Following the
"amalgamation" or unification of the northern and southern
protectorates in 1914, the judicial structure consisted, in order from
lowest to highest tribunal: native courts, provincial courts, the
supreme court, and the West African court of appeal. 91
Whether judicial independence existed in the colonial period is
more complicated than in the pre-colonial era. Although there was no
true democracy, incipient structures for judicial independence evident
in traditional Western adjudicative tribunals evolved in Nigeria;
however, those structures lacked independence in the substantive
sense. As Akin Alao points out in his study of judicial reforms in
colonial Nigeria, 92 "the incessant intervention of the executive in the
process of judicial administration and its control of the purse were
potent enough to frustrate the judiciary." 93 Examples of these
interventions include that the attorney-general office assumed a
supervising role over the chief justice, and that "[o]n many occasions,
the governor, acting on the advice of the attorney general, bypassed
the chief justice in recommending applications for judicial
appointments to the Colonial Office in London." 94 There were
moments when, without question, the judiciary was turned into a
handmaid of the executive. For example, prior to 1914, as ex-officio
commissioners of the Supreme Court, the district officers participated
in the judicial work of district courts. 95 Thus, although during the
88. Id. at 212.
89. Id. at 213.
90. Courts and Justice Admin. in Nigeria, supra note 65, at 5-6 (discussing
courts during the colonial era).
91. Alao, supra note 86, at 206; Courts and Justice Admin. in Nigeria, supra
note 65, at 6.
92. See Alao, supra note 86, at 201-15.
93. Id. at 209.
94. Id.
95. Courts and Justice Admin. in Nigeria, supra note 65, at 6. Ex officio means
authority "without any other warrant or appointment than that resulting from the
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colonial period tribunals evolved capable of assuming judicial
functions in the sense we know it today in the political system, the
judiciary was almost indistinguishably linked to the executive branch
in an environment practically devoid of legislative oversight. 96 This
made it difficult to ascribe independence to the judiciary in any real
sense of the word.
C. Post-ColonialPeriod
The potentials for judicial independence increased substantially
during the post-colonial period. For one thing, the political
independence and the freedom from foreign rule that came with it
presaged a new-dawn opportunity for the construction of autonomous
national institutions,97 including independent judiciaries. The one
downside, however, was repeated military interventions into the
political system. 98 Soon after independence, dictatorial military rule
perverted democracy in Nigeria, with severely deleterious
consequences for many institutions of the political system, including
the judiciary. 99 By the time the scourge of military dictatorships ran its
holding of a particular office." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 399 (abridged 6th ed.
1991). It is powers "exercised by an officer which are not specifically conferred
upon [that officer], but are necessarily implied in [the] office." Id. In this case, the
district officers who participated in Supreme Court work "achieved" that office by
virtue of their position as district officers, rather than because of any formal
appointment to the high court.
96. See Alao, supra note 86, at 211 (pointing out that despite the simulacrum
of judicial reforms unveiled during this era, "the on-the-spot agents of colonial
administration still believed in the supremacy of the executive over the judiciary," to
the detriment of judicial independence).
97.

See, e.g., MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: A HISTORY OF THE

CONTINENT

SINCE

INDEPENDENCE

141-61

and updated

(revised

ed. 2011)

(documenting the prospects for development, later mostly unrealized, that political
independence

portended in many African countries);

ROLAND OLIVER: THE

AFRICAN EXPERIENCE: MAJOR THEMES IN AFRICAN HISTORY FROM EARLIEST TIMES

TO THE PRESENT 227-40 (1991) (same).
98. See, e.g., CHARLES HAUSS & MELISSA

HAUSSMAN,

COMPARATIVE

POLITICS: DOMESTIC RESPONSES TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 435, 440-53 (8th

2013) (discussing the evolution of the Nigerian state,

ed.

including the periods of

military rule); TOYIN FALOLA ET. AL., THE MILITARY FACTOR IN NIGERIA,

1966-

1985, 1-18 (1994) (covering the period up until 1985).
99. See, eg., FALOLA ET. AL., supra note 98, at 33-205 (covering the effect of

military rule on numerous institutions that include the economy, the press, and
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course in 1999, the country had lived through nearly three decades of
these brutal regimes, the first from 1966 to 1979 and the second from
1983 to 1999.100 During these periods, military dictators disbanded
the legislature and ruled by military decrees, as well as suspended
many sections of the constitution, including those dealing with
fundamental freedoms."o' With specific reference to the court system,
military rulers restricted the judicial review powers of the judiciary,
removed judges from office arbitrarily, and operated military tribunals
to whom they transferred some of the functions of the regular
courts.1 02 Given these severe restrictions, the climate of judicial
independence during military regimes resembled the colonial period,
where the executive powers so loomed wholesale over the political
system that even the judiciary operated like an extension of an
unchecked executive branch.103 No wonder that a Constitutional
Conference the military regime set up in 1994 found that the operation
of the Nigerian governments at the federal and state levels lacked
separation of powers, "particularly with reference to the judiciary." 1 04
Outside the military regime eras, two different types of
democratic systems existed in the post-colonial era with equally
different implications for judicial independence. The first was the
parliamentary system of government, inherited from the U.K. and

conduct of foreign affairs); ISIKILU BAYO OLOYEDE, THE PRESS UNDER MILITARY
RULE IN NIGERIA (1966-1993): AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL NARRATIVE (2004)

(focusing on the press); Ekeh, supra note 68 (listing the "curse" of military rule in
Nigeria to include the negation of constitutionalism and federalism). See also infra
Part V.A. (commenting on the necessity for civilian rule in any strategy for
promoting increased judicial independence in Nigeria).
100. See HAUSS & HAUSSMAN, supra note 98, at 448-49 (first period of
military rule); id. at 451-52 (second period of military rule up until 1999); FALOLA
ET. AL., supra note 98, at 1-18 (straddling both periods but ending the narrative in
1985).
101. See Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 572 (referring to the action of
General Muhammadu Buhari, Head of State from 1983 to 1985).
102. See FALOLA ET. AL., supra note 98, at 159-60.

103. See id. at 160 (pointing out that under military rule, "[t]he states and their
organs were no more than administrative units of the federal government,"
unchecked by constitutional, legislative, and judicial restraints, or by public
opinion).
104. Cited in Oko, supra note 12, at 73 n.322.
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practiced in Nigeria from 1960 to 1966.105 The second was the
presidential system of government, initially from 1979 to 1983 and
subsequently from 1999 to the present period.10 6 Because legislative
or parliamentary supremacy is the norm under a parliamentary system,
the expectation, theoretically, is that little room exists for judicial
review under such a political arrangement. 0 7
In contrast, a
presidential system affords more room for judicial review, and with it
increased opportunity for judicial independence. 0 8 To what extent
this is true of Nigeria is an issue determined in Part III. of this article,
which analyzes the reality of judicial independence under the Fourth
Republic.
III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

Part I. of, this article provided a definition of judicial
independence that included a highlight of the key indicators of judicial
independence drawn from the literature on the topic. Part II. laid out a
historical background necessary for understanding judicial
independence in Nigeria. This section, Part III., discusses in precise
terms the extent of the gap that exists between the theory and practice
of judicial independence in Nigeria since 1999. There are two
interrelated aspects to the discussion that follows: the first is an
application of the seven indicators of judicial independence distilled in
Part I. to the provisions relating to judicial independence under the

105. See HAUSS & HAUSSMAN, supra note 98, at 446-48 (analyzing the First
Republic).
106. See id. at 449-51 (analyzing the period of the Second Republic); id. at
452-54 (covering the period since 1999).
107. Under the British system that Nigeria inherited upon independence in
1960, parliamentary supremacy dictates "that Parliament-not the crown, the courts,
or any other institution-is the supreme authority" within the political system.
SODARO, supra note 9, at 401.
108. An independent judiciary with judicial review powers is an essential
feature of a presidential system of government. See id. at 195-96 (listing the
characteristic features of a presidential system of government, exemplified by the
U.S., as including a president and legislature elected separately; lawmaking
authority based on a balance of legislative and presidential powers; the powers of
judicial review; and the authority of the president, the legislature, and subnational
governments to override decisions of the judiciary, especially the highest court of
the land).
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Nigerian constitution; the second is an alternative measurement of the
gap between theory and practice in judicial independence based on the
U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights
Practice.109 The use of these two tools of evidence conduces with the
comparative checking technique in comparative political analysis,
which mandates the researcher to test his or her argument against
multiple cases, rather than limit examination to just one case.110
A. Weighing Nigeria's ConstitutionalProvisionsfor Judicial
Independence against the Seven Key Indicators Developed in PartL
Nigeria's 1999 Constitution contains ample provisions relating to
judicial independence. These include:
* that judges be appointed through a process that is
relatively insulated from politics;."'
* that they enjoy security of tenure and serve until they
attain the age of retirement, 112 within which period their

109. The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices is a human rights
monitoring tool prepared by the U.S. State Department and released in the Spring of
every year to facilitate the conduct of U.S. foreign relations in other countries,
including economic and military assistance. See Philip C. Aka, The Country Reports
on Human Rights Practicesand U.S. Human Rights Policy in a Changing World, 14
PERSP. ON GLOBAL DEV. & TECH. 238, 243-245 (2015) (describing the features of

the Country Reports).
110. DICKOVICK& EASTWOOD, supra note 18, at 17-18.
111.

See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 231,

§§ (1)-(2)

(providing that the Chief Justice and the justices of the Supreme Court should be
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council
("NJC"), subject to confirmation by the Senate); id. art. 238, § (1) (providing that
the president of the Court of Appeal should be appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the NJC, subject to confirmation by the Senate); id. art. 238, §
(2) (providing that other judges of the Court of Appeal should be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of the NJC); id. art. 250, § (1) (providing that the
chief judge of the Federal High Court should be appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the NJC, subject to confirmation by the Senate); see also id. art.
271, § (1) (providing that the chief judge should be appointed by the state governor
on the recommendation of the NJC, subject to confirmation by the State House of
Assembly); id. art. 271, § (2) (providing that other state high court judges should be
appointed by the state governors on the recommendation of the NJC).
112. Id. art. 291, § (1) (providing that justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeal may retire voluntarily at 65 and mandatorily at 70); id. art. 291, §
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salaries and conditions of service may not be altered to
their disadvantage; 113
* that they may not be removed from office before their
retirement, except in clearly-specified circumstances. 114
* Article 6 of the 1999 Constitution articulates and defines
the "judicial powers of the Federation," thus
unambiguously creating the judiciary as the third arm of
the Nigerian government.115
* Nigeria, like the United States, has a presidential system of
government that is based on the separation of the powers
into three branches of government, wherein each branch
checks the other under a check-and-balance arrangement
integral to that system. 116
Entrenchment of these provisions in the constitution as ground
norm or basic law of the land signifies that an independent judiciary is
a value that Nigerians cherish, consistent with the presidential system
(2) (stipulating that other non-Supreme Court judges may retire voluntarily at 60 and
mandatorily at 65).
113. Id. art. 84, §§ 2, 4 (including Judicial officers among office holders
whose remuneration, salaries, and allowances are "a charge upon the Consolidated
Revenue Fund" of the country, meaning that the remuneration, salaries, and their
conditions of service, excepting allowances, "shall not be altered to their
disadvantage after their appointment").
114. Id. art. 292,§ (1).
115. Id. art. 6 (stipulating that the powers established for the Federation are
vested in the courts). These powers are then spelled out fully under articles 230-96,
forming Chapter IV, "Judicature," and comprising four main parts: federal courts,
state courts, election tribunals, and miscellaneous issues (mostly conditions of
service), denominated "supplemental." See id. art. 230-96.
116. See generally id. Like the 1979 one that preceded it, Nigeria's 1999
Constitution is modeled on the U.S. presidential system of government. See
Diamond, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that "[c]losely modeled after the U.S. system,"
Nigeria's Second Republic constitution "provided for an elected president and vicepresident ... a bicameral National Assembly .. . an independent judiciary, headed
by a Supreme Court and State High Courts ... and a detailed chapter on
fundamental human rights"). See also GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM HEARD ROUND THE WORLD, 1776-1989: A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 350 (2001) (commenting on the influence of U.S. constitutionalism
abroad); Andrzej Rapaczynski, Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of U.S.
ConstitutionalismAbroad, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 405, 452-53 (Albert J. Rosenthal &

Louis Henkin, eds. 1990) (commenting similarly).
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of government they adopted back to the Second Republic, in a
constitutional engineering attempt to revamp their political system and
correct the problems of the past that included a bloody civil war.11 7
To what extent do the provisions of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution
meet the seven indicators of judicial independence under the IBA's
Minimum Standards developed in Part I. of this article? The
outcomes are summarized in Table I with comments on each
indicator.
TABLE

1: NIGERIA'S RANKINGS ON THE INDICATORS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE1

8

Measure

Whether condition is
met?

Ban against exceptional or military courts
Separation of powers
Exclusive authority
Finality of decisions
Enumerated qualifications
Guaranteed terms
Fiscal autonomy

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Nigeria meets the first indicator, which is the ban against
exceptional or military courts. The 1999 Constitution provides that
"[i]n the determination of his civil rights . . . a person shall be entitled
to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal
established by law and constituted in such manner as to secure its
117. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 47 (commenting on innovations in
"institutional architecture" designed to promote "a more durable political
foundation"); see also C.S. Whitaker, Jr., Second Beginnings: The New Political
Framework, 11 ISSUE 2-13 (1981); Claude S. Phillips, Nigeria's New Political
Institutions, 1975-79, 18 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 1-22 (1980).

Constitutional

engineering is the design of political institutions in a society in an attempt to realize
some

desired political

ends.

See,

e.g.,

GIOVANNI

SATORI,

COMPARATIVE

CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND

OUTCOMES (2d ed. 1997) (applying the concept of constitutional engineering to
countries in various parts of the world); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC
SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991)

(discussing constitutional engineering in South Africa).
118. Table created by author.
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independence and impartiality."1 l 9 A court with the aforementioned
features is more likely than not to be an ordinary rather than an

exceptional or military court. The second indicator, separation of
powers, is equally met. The provision that insulates the judiciary from
the political sphere applies here, as do provisions in the constitution
relating to judicial powers, separation of powers, and checks and
balances, all features integral to Nigeria's presidential system of

government. 120
The third and fourth indicators concerning exclusive authority and
finality of decisions respectively are closely related and mirror the
second indicator dealing with separated powers. Consequently, one
can infer that the Nigerian constitution also meets the third and fourth
indicators. Further, with regard to finality of decisions, the Nigerian
constitution states that "[w]ithout prejudice to the powers of the
President or of the Governor of a State with respect to prerogatives of
mercy, no appeal shall lie to any other body or person from any
determination of" the Supreme Court.12 1
Regarding the fifth and sixth indicators, enumerated qualifications
and guaranteedterms respectively, careful review of the provision on
tenure of security and related matters reveals that Nigeria's 1999
Constitution also meets these two indicators. Unlike their Article III
counterparts in the U.S., Nigerian constitutional judges do not enjoy
lifetime tenure. Instead, under the 1999 Constitution, Supreme Court
judges face mandatory retirement when they turn seventy years old,
while non-Supreme Court judges do so when they reach sixty-five
years of age.122 Mandatory retirement in Nigeria's judicial system
differs starkly from the U.S., where federal judges serve a life tenure
on the bench.12 3 However, U.S. Supreme Court justices may be

119. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 36, § 1 (emphasis
added).
120. See supra notes 111, 115-16, and corresponding texts.
121. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 235.
122. Compare id. art. 291, § 1 (retirement age for Supreme Court judges and
judges of the Court of Appeal), with id. art. 291, § 2 (retirement age for judges other
than those of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal).
123. See U.S. CONST., supra note 55, art. III, § I (providing that federal judges
"shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour").
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discharged through impeachment, for multiple reasons.1 24 The
Nigerian notion of guaranteedterms, therefore, clearly diverges from
the U.S. judicial system. In the light of this divergence, there remains
a question as to whether it is appropriate to assign a "yes" value to the
guaranteedterms indicator.
This divergence of guaranteed terms from the U.S. is a major
point of contention by some Nigerian commentators who have argued
that Nigeria should follow the U.S. practice.' 2 5 One typical argument
on this matter is by one critic, Nathaniel Ukoima, who opined that
mandatory retirement at seventy years old for Supreme Court justices
"is breeding ground for insecurity and judicial incapacity," capable of
militating against judicial independence.1 26 "A judge who is burdened
with financial considerations of retirement years is not an independent
judge. A judge who is burdened with the politics of advancement or
succession is not a free judge." 27 According to this critic, in order for
the Nigerian judiciary to "act as a safeguard against. . . governmental
encroachment" while increasing the chance of Nigerian Supreme
Court justices to "give ... bold and honest decision," these justices
should have lifetime appointments, subject to certain impeachment
and removal conditions.'28
Although the observation of this critic contributes some useful
insight to the discussion, Nigeria appears to meet the guaranteed
124. Compare U.S. CONST., supra note 55, art. III, § 1 (permitting federal
judges to hold offices "during good Behaviour"), with id. art. II (stipulating that "all
civil Officers of the United States," seemingly including judges, may be impeached
and removed from office upon conviction for "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors").
125. See, e.g., Nathaniel Ukoima, Nigeria: Concept of Federalism, BLOGGER,
http://www.ukoima.blogspot.com/p/Nigeria-concept-of-federalism.html (last visited
Dec. 11, 2014).
126. Ukoima, supra note 125.
127. Id. The author opined that "[a] recent petition against the Chief Justice of
Nigerian Supreme Court alleged that he had been honest before now, but due to his
impending retirement, he has started amassing wealth through the abuse of his
office." Id.
128. Id.; cf A.N.C. Ikoro, A Case for Elongation of Tenure of Nigerian
Judges, CHANNELKOOS (Nov. 3, 2011), www.channelkoos.com/index.php/
features/301-a-case-for-elongation-of-tenure-of-nigerian-judges ("Since we make
bold to copy so many things from America [sic] why do we foot-drag when it comes
to copying better things from that country?").
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terms requirement.
The BA's Minimum Standards state that
"[j]udicial appointments should generally be for life, subject to
removal for cause and compulsory retirement at an age fixed by law at
the date of appointment."l 29 Similarly, the Basic Principles on
Judicial Independence stipulate that "[t]he term of office of judges,
their independence, security, adequate remuneration, conditions of
service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured
by law."' 3 0 More specifically, the Basic Principles state that judges
"shall have guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the
expiry of their term of office, where such exists."13 1 The provisions in
Nigeria's 1999 Constitution meet these standards.
Fiscal autonomy is the only condition in Table 1 that is not met.
As one author noted, "[b]oth the appearance and reality of
independence demand that the judiciary should have complete control
over its funds."l 32 Although the provision for judicial independence
recounted above suggests fiscal autonomy for the judiciary, in
practice, that autonomy does not exist. Instead, under the Fourth
Republic, the President controls funds allocated to the judiciary,
impelling judges to "depend on the goodwill of the executive branch
for funding."1 33 This occurrence undermines the protections for
judicial independence in the Nigerian constitution.
An unfortunate history, one laced in missed opportunities to fix a
nagging problem, underlies the Nigerian judiciary's lack of fiscal
autonomy. The draft of the 1979 constitution, dusted up with minor
changes and adopted as the 1999 Constitution,1 34 included a provision
in the document that stated: "[I]n respect of the Capital and Recurrent
129. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 22 (addressing the terms and nature of
judicial appointments). This provision confusedly conflates lifetime appointment
and compulsory retirement. See id.
130. Basic Principles on Judicial Independence, supra note 7, § 11 (addressing
the conditions of service and tenure of judges).
131. Id. § 12 (discussing the conditions of service and tenure ofjudges).
132. Oko, supra note 12, at 77.
133. Id. at 76. See id. at 77, for a quote attributed to a former President of the
Court of Appeals, where he stated that "[i]t is ... no use speaking of the judiciary as
the third arm of the government if that arm has wittingly or unwittingly been
consigned to the role of beggar, living at the mercy of the other two powerful arms."
134. See Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 574 (portraying the 1999
Constitution as "essentially the 1979 constitution reinstated").
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Expenditure of the Judicial Service of the Federation, [resources] shall
be withdrawn from the Fund and paid into a special account of the
Federation under the control of the judiciary of the Federation."' 3 5
However, the departing military government under General Olusegun
Obasanjo deleted this provision from the final document that he later
signed into law.' 36 Another missed opportunity turned up in 1994
when a constitutional conference set up by another military
government proposed an amendment that would have empowered the
judiciary to
prepare its own annual budget and defend same. The approved
budgetary allocation of the [J]udiciary should be disbursed directly
to the Judiciary as in the case of Local Governments. The Judiciary
should have its own accounting administration with the DirectorGeneral as the Chief Accounting Officer who should be responsible
directly to the Chief Justice or Head of Superior Courts of Record,
as the case may be.1 37
But, like the proposal in 1979, this one too did not become law. The
lack of fiscal autonomy has led to "gross underfunding," 3 1 which
complicates the ability of Nigerian courts, especially at the nonfederal levels, to secure the infrastructure that judges and other court
officials need to do their jobs well.1 39
135. Cited in Oko, supra note 12, at 78.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 79 n.351 (quoting the report of a Constitutional Conference
Committee created by the military government in 1994-1995).
138. See, e.g., Okey Wali, Problems Facing Judiciary,Justice Delivery, are
Multi-Dimensional,
NEWSWATCH
TIMES
(Nov.
25,
2013),
http://www.mydailynewswatchng.com/problems-facing-judiciary-justice-deliverymulti-dimensional-okey-wali (bemoaning several problems that Nigerian courts
face, including inadequate funding).
139. See Adam Adedimeji, Nigerian Judges are Poorly Equipped, Boma
Ozobia, DAILY INDEPENDENT, http://www.dailyindependentnig.com/2013/01/
Nigerian-judges-are-poorly-equipped-boma-ozobia/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). At
the time of this interview, Ozobia was the president of the Nigerian Bar Association.
Id. Tools Nigerian judges and other court officials need to do their jobs that they
don't have include spacious courtrooms, law libraries, research assistants, secretarial
and stenographic services, steady power supply, computers and visual aid
equipment, photocopiers, stationery, and transcript services. See Oko, supra note 12,
at 43-44. To illustrate the direness of the situation, due to inadequate access to
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B. Weighing the Extent ofJudicialIndependence in Nigeria,
Using the U.S. State Department'sCountry
Reports on Human Rights Practices
This subsection examines four samples of the Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for Nigeria, germane to the period under
review. The four samples are: the 1999 Report from the beginning of
the Fourth Republic, the 2003 Report from midway into the Fourth
Republic, and the 2012 Report and 2013 Report, the nearest to the
present period. These reports do not suggest that the source of
information is the most objective on judicial independence; nor do
they dismiss the political coloration embedded in a tool designed
mostly to promote U.S. foreign policy abroad and provide a gauge for
the disbursement of military and economic assistance. 140 Instead, the
data are used to complement and complicate this analysis in a manner
that additionally amplifies the connection between judicial
independence and human rights.
While one would expect improvements in judicial independence
under the Fourth Republic from 1999 to the present period, this is not
the case over the fourteen years covered by the four samples. Most
discouragingly, these reports are strikingly similar, down to language,
demonstrating little to no improvement over time. The quotations
below demonstrate the similarities between the four sample reports
and showcase this discouraging situation:
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
practice, the judicial branch remains susceptible to executive and
legislative branch pressure, influence by political leaders at both the
stenographic services, judges are impelled to write their notes in longhand during
their bench trial proceedings, where they must also gauge the demeanor of witnesses
for truthfulness. Id. at 43. The situation is especially dire in state courts, where many
litigants "are required to bring their own stationery for their cases." Chinonye
Obiagwu & Chidi Anselem Odinkalu, Nigeria: Combating Legacies of Colonialism
and Militarism, in HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING

THE PROMISE FOR OURSELVES 211, 237 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, ed., 2003). The

scarcity of work tools creates an environment susceptible to corruption by
unprincipled public officials. Oko, supra note 12, at 43.
140. Aka, supra note 109, at 238-260 (appraising the role of the Country
Reports in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy with suggestions for improving the
effectiveness of the reporting and monitoring system).
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state and federal levels, and suffers from corruption and
inefficiency. 141
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however,
the judicial branch remained susceptible to executive and
legislative branch pressure. Decisions at the federal level were
indicative of greater independence. The judiciary was influenced by
political leaders[,] particularly at the state and local levels. 142
Although the constitution and law provide for an independent
judiciary, the judicial branch remained susceptible to pressure from
the executive and legislative branches and the business sector.
Political leaders influenced the judiciary, particularly at the state
and local levels. 143
The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary in
civil matters. The executive, legislature, and business interests,
however, exerted undue influence and pressure in civil cases.
Official corruption and lack of will to implement court decisions
also interfered with the process. While the law provides for access
to the courts for redress of grievances, and courts can award

141.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICES: NIGERIA

(2000), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/65.htm.

142. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 2003, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: NIGERIA (2004), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27743.htm

[hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT 2003: NIGERIA]. Section e. of the Report deals with

the denial of fair public trial. Id. The opening summary of the Report indicates that:
Although the judicial branch remained susceptible to executive and
legislative branch pressures, the performance of the Supreme Court and
decisions at the federal appellate level were indicative of growing
independence. State and local judiciary were significantly influenced by
political leaders and suffered from corruption and inefficiency more than
the federal court system.
Id. The author is indebted to the editorial staff of California Western International
Law Journalfor their keen observation leading to this more nuanced analysis.
143.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 2012, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
(2013),
NIGERIA
PRACTICES:
204365.pdf [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT 2012: NIGERIA].
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damages and issue injunctions to stop or prevent a human rights
violation, the decisions of civil courts were difficult to enforce. 4
C. RecapitulatingJudicialIndependence in Nigeria,Based on the
Seven Indicatorsand the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices
This assessment of judicial independence under the Fourth
Republic, based on the indicators of judicial independence distilled in
Part I. and the four samples of the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for the periods germane to this work, showed mixed results.
Nigeria's 1999 Constitution included impressive provisions regarding
judicial independence, and the application of the seven indicators of
constitutional measures showed that Nigeria has performed well on
every measure, except fiscal autonomy. Furthermore, legal scholars
who have studied this matter acknowledge the measure of progress.
For example, Professor Okechukwu Oko observed that the National
Judicial Council's ("NJC") "insistence on probity and accountability
has made a lasting impression on judges who now operate with a
heightened awareness of their limitations."14 5 Professor Oko's
assessment of the National Judicial Institute ("NJI") was equally
glowing. 146 He noted that the Institute "has significantly and
positively affected the overall performance of the judiciary." 47
Through its seminars, conferences, and workshops, it has provided
judges "with an enhanced understanding and greater appreciation of
the ethical and intellectual underpinnings of their positions."1 48
Finally, Professor Oko indicated that "through lectures and the grant
of scholarships, the Institute has helped judges to ponder and reflect

144. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 2013, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

PRACTICES:

NIGERIA

(2014),

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/

220358.pdf [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORT 2013: NIGERIA].

145. Oko, supra note 12, at 59.
146. Established in 1991, the NJI promotes efficiency, uniformity, and
effectiveness of judicial services in the country, including continuing education for
judges. See Appendix B. (spotlighting various agencies, including the NJI,
connected with judicial independence in Nigeria).
147. Oko, supra note 12, at 67.
148. Id.
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on their position and the best way to approach their role as
adjudicators."149

Even so, several problems still remain that suggest a gap between
theory and actual practice. Besides the Country Reports' longitudinal
accounts suggesting little movement towards judicial independence,
there are also other unresolved ills afflicting the Nigerian judiciary.
Some of those ills are externally driven, others self-imposed, but all
have ramifications for judicial independence.
Professor Oko
identified a number of these ills: corruption; interference with the
judicial process through physical and nonphysical means by
individuals or government entities interested in the judicial outcome;
and institutional problems, such as lack of infrastructure, and long
delays. 150 These problems led Professor Oko to conclude that "[i]n
practice ... judicial independence remains extremely fragile,
implacably assaulted by politicians and corrupt judges."' 5 ' Review of
samples of the Country Reports for various years pertinent to this
article, including those from 2012 to 2013 postdating Professor Oko's
research, leads to a similar conclusion. Finally, to complete these
assessments, in 2014, Human Rights Watch portrayed the Nigerian
judiciary as "weak and overburdened."l 5 2
Having analyzed judicial independence in Nigeria under the
Fourth Republic, or the lack thereof, the real challenge now is to
change that predicament. Many writers, like Professor Oko, place the
burden and responsibility for changing the lack of judicial
independence on the governmental branches, including the
judiciary. 113 This study takes a more calibrated and consolidated
149. Id.
150. See Oko, supra note 12, at 11-82.
151. Id. at 72.
152. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2014: NIGERIA (2014),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related-material/nigeria 3.pdf.
153. See Oko, supra note 12, at 72-73. Professor Oko indicates:
The experience in Nigeria reveals that intolerance, contempt for the
judiciary and the desire to control and manipulate the judiciary continually
swirl within the executive. Elected officials and politicians often push or
prod judges to forfeit their impartiality and independence. The judiciary,
on its part, has some judges who either lack or fail to demonstrate the
integrity needed to resist pressures and overtures on them to deviate from
acceptable judicial behavior.
Id.
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approach by integrating the contribution of the masses to the public
good of judicial independence and precept of the rule of law linked
with it. That is the purpose of the final part of this article, which
outlines several steps for promoting increased judicial independence
in Nigeria. Before then, it is necessary to pause to reflect on some
forces in the changing landscape of politics in the country with
possible ramifications for judicial independence.
IV.

Two FACTORS OF NIGERIAN POLITICS WITH POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Two factors from Nigerian politics under the Second Republic
since 1999 with potential implications for judicial independence are
the adoption of sharia code in the twelve northern states, and the
invigoration of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. The first
seems negative while the second is potentially positive.
The first of these developments is the adoption of sharia law as
criminal code in twelve northern states,154 beginning in January
2000,155 almost from the onset of the Fourth Republic. The effects of
the adoption and implementation of sharia law were magnified by the
introduction of private sharia instruments, known as Independent
Sharia Panels ("ISPs"), in non-northern cities with sizable Muslim
populations, such as Ijebu-Ode, Ibadan, and Lagos in Western
Nigeria.156

Going further, Nigeria's sharia states created hisbah

organization, or sharia police, charged with responsibility for
prosecuting a range of offenses,

including "social vices" like

154. See Analysis: Nigeria's Sharia Split, BBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2003),
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/2632939.stm; see also Philip C. Aka, Nigeria Since May
1999: Understandingthe Paradoxof Civil Rule and Human Rights Violations under
President Olusegun Obasanjo, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J 209, 240-46 (2003). The
twelve sharia states are Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina,
Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. Id. at 240 n. 190; Nigeria's Sharia Split,
supra (including a map of Nigeria showing the twelve sharia states).
155. See Nigerian Muslims Welcome Sharia Law, BBC NEWS (Jan. 27,
2000), news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/620058.stm (reporting on the adoption of sharia
law in Zamfara, the first state in the country to embrace this law).
156. Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 577. Under ISPs, private parties
embark on a private arrangement, not supported by the government, to apply Islamic
law to settle disputes, whose jurisdiction they consent to and judgment they agree to
abide by. Id.
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prostitution, mixing of the sexes, and drinking in public places.15 7
Taken together, these actions had the effect of restoring sharia law in
Northern Nigeria "to a state of completeness and a degree of
autonomy" never seen before in the country "for over a century." 5 8
This introduction of sharia law upset the agreement on the eve of
independence, which confined the application of sharia law to issues
of family and personal status law, such as marriage, divorce, child
custody, and inheritance.1 59 It also ended the former practice under
which the entire nation, including the North, was governed by one
criminal code that provided punishments for criminal offenses
throughout the nation.' 60 Subsequently, contrary to the letter and
spirit of the Settlement of 1960,161 some Northern leaders worked
furtively yet diligently to expand the role of sharia law in the public
square. These attempts took place under successive military regimes,
157. See Sharia Police Smash 240,000 Bottles of Beer in Kano, VANGUARD
(Nov. 27, 2013), www.vanguardngr.com/2013/1 1/sharia-police-smash-240000bottles-beer-kano (enforcing alcohol prohibition in Kano); Rasheed Olaniyi, Hisba
and Sharia Law Enforcement in Metropolitan Kano, 57 AFR. TODAY 70-96 (2011)
(analyzing the operation of this police in a major northern Nigerian city); Nigeria's
Religious

Police:

Out

of

Patrol, THE

ECONOMIsT

(June

11,

2010),

www.economist.com/node/6311947 (discussing Islamic police searches for cheats
and hoarders to ensure "just prices" in Kano open marketplaces); SHARIA
IMPLEMENTATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 1999-2006: A SOURCEBOOK (Philip

Ostien, compiler and ed. 2007). The enforcements create an environment
reminiscent of the U.S. from 1920 to 1933, during Prohibition. See, e.g., EDWARD
BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA (1996) (providing

a history of the U.S. government's failed attempt to prohibit the making, selling, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors); JOHN KOBLER, ARDENT SPIRITS: THE RISE
AND FALL OF PROHIBITION (1973) (documenting the full range of the temperance

movement in the U.S. from the 17th century to the prohibition years).
158. Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 576.
159. Id. at 567 (commenting on "the Settlement of 1960"). Supported by the
departing British colonial authorities, the settlement was necessary to protect basic
rights for all citizens and to promote economic relations in the new nation. Id. at
566-67. The French administrative approach in neighboring countries was one
where religious leaders were stripped of power; this is in contrast to British practice
that left control to the Emirs, who held sway as religious and political leaders.
Brenda Koerner, How Did Sharia Get to Nigeria?, SLATE (Aug. 22, 2003, 4:48 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/explainer/2003/08/how-did-sharia
getjtonigeria.html.
160. See Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 555-612.
161. See supra note 159.
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beginning in 1979, when northern Muslims staged a walk-out during
the drafting of the Second Republic constitution, following the defeat
of their proposal to include a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal in the
constitution.1 62 The impasse was resolved in 1979, during the rule of
General Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian, only following agreement by
the Constituent Assembly, which wrote into the new constitution
provisions for State Sharia Courts of Appeal "for any state that
requires it," and, in the same manner, Customary Courts of Appeal,
"for any state that requires it." 163 Successive military rulers, all of
whom were Muslims, did not approach the sharia issue with the same
even-handedness. For example, in 1986, General Ibrahim Babangida
(Head of State from 1985 to 1993), clandestinely enrolled the country
into the Organization of the Islamic Conference, backing off only
following a deafening public outcry from Christians in all parts of the

country.164
162. See David D. Laitin, The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's
Second Republic, 20 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 411-30 (1982); Ostien & Dekker, supra

note 83, at 571-72.
163. Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 572. The Constituent Assembly was
the political body that reviewed the draft constitution that the Constitutional
Drafting Committee, a group of fifty experts, many of them experienced legal
practitioners, put together for the country. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 46
(analyzing the transition to the Second Republic in 1979).
164. Charles T. Powers, Nigeria Divided Over Close Islamic Ties: Christians
in South Decry Move to Join Key Muslim Organization,L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1986),
http://www.articles.latimes.com/1986-02-15/news/mn-8172_lnigerian-press. Since
1967, Nigeria participated in IOC meetings as an observer, but in 1986, on the eve
of the controversy, the Babangida military government sent a delegation led by a
cabinet minister, Rilwanu Lukman, himself a Muslim. Id. The year 1967 is
significant because it was when the 1967 to 1970 civil war started. See FALOLA ET.
AL., supra note 98, at 19-32 (discussing the forces leading to war and the military
regime's conduct of the war). Eastern Nigeria, which declared independence from
Nigeria as Biafra, is singularly the most Christian portion of the country, compared,
for example, to Western Nigeria, which is divided almost equally between
Christians and Muslims. See Philip C. Aka, The "Dividend of Democracy":
Analyzing U.S. Supportfor Nigerian Democratization, 22 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD
WORLD L.J. 225, 233 (pointing out that "[a]lthough adherents of Christianity and
Islam, Nigeria's two major religions, can be found in all parts of the country, most
Hausa-Fulanis are Muslim, and most Igbos are Christian," with Yorubas "divided
about equally between these two religions"). One possible reading of Nigeria's
entrance in 1967 as an IOC observer would be that with Eastern Nigeria focused on
secession, the northern-dominated Nigerian government, driven by a desire to spread
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The solicitude for sharia law in northern Nigeria reached an alltime high with the adoption and implementation of this law in the
twelve states in the region beginning, as indicated before, with
Zamfara State in the Northwestern portion of the country, in 2000.165
Though the Nigerian constitution forbids the adoption of a state
religion, 166 none of Nigeria's three presidents under the Fourth
Republic, all of them members of the dominant People's Democratic
Party ("PDP"), have seen it fit to seek a ruling by the Nigerian
Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of the twelve northern
states' adoption of sharia law as criminal code, contrary to the
settlement of 1960.167 Although enthusiasm for aggressive
Islam to non-northern portions of the country, saw it fit to expand relations with the
Muslim world. It is also possible that the government used its IOC observer status
as a ploy to seek military and diplomatic assistance that it needed to terminate the
Biafran secession, particularly support from the Muslim world. See, e.g., Chris
Chidebe, Nigeria and the Arab States, 2 AM. J. ISLAMIC Soc. SCIENCES 115-23

(1985) (maintaining that during the war, Israeli support for Biafra "was countered by
general Arab support for the federal government" and that, fearing the possibility
that Nigeria "was about to be dismembered through the chicanery of Israel," some
Arab countries made it a point to offer at least diplomatic support to the federal
government). This was not the only attempt by Babangida to expand the role of
sharia law in the Nigerian public square. He also worked hard to change the
provisions in the constitution relating to Islamic sharia law. See Ostien & Dekker,
supra note 83, at 574-75 (noting that in 1986, General Babangida "deleted the word
personal wherever it occurred after the word Islamic in the sections of the 1979
constitution touching on Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction").
165. See Nigerian Muslims Welcome ShariaLaw, supra note 155.
166.

See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 10 (providing

that "[t]he Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as
State Religion"). Consistent with this provision, two high courts in the sharia states
have ruled the attempt by Borno State in 2002 and that of Niger State in 2003 to
expand their criminal laws, unconstitutional. Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at
607-08 n.15. Intriguingly, advocates for extension of sharia law into the criminal
code find part of the basis for their position in the Nigerian constitution, specifically,
article 38 (2) of the document, which provides for freedom of religion. See
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 38 (2).

167. Part of the reason is because Nigeria is a country where, as Human Rights
Watch indicated in its 2004 report on the sharia issue, "religious divisions run deep."
"PoliticalSharia"? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 1 (Sept. 2004), www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeriaO9O4/. In the
language of one Nigerian banker in Kano in 1986: "Anytime you start talking about
religion in this country, you are playing with fire. At its most extreme, what you're
talking about is Christians and Muslims fighting each other in the streets." Powers,
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implementation of sharia law appeared to wane with the passage of
time,168 the adoption of sharia law as criminal code remains an issue
with possible negative implication for judicial independence.1 69 if

supra note 164. Predictably, sporadic outbreaks of violence followed the
introduction of criminal sharia law in many northern states, including Kano where
the banker lived. Id. In one such incident in Kaduna, another major northern city, in
February 2000, more than 2,000 people died in street protests that the Nigerian army
finally brought under control. Dan Isaacs, Islam in Nigeria: Simmering Tensions,
BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2003), http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/3155279.stm;
see also Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 577 (estimating the number of the dead
as "hundreds, perhaps thousands").
168. See Ostien & Dekker, supra note 83, at 602 (pointing out that "[a]lthough
it continues as an official program of a number of northern state governments, and is
still advancing on various fronts, sharia implementation has nevertheless become
largely irrelevant to the national discourse"). Several reasons account for the
reduced ardor. First is the draconian nature of sharia justice, "sentences shocking to
modern sensibilities." Id. at 592. These sentences include amputation of limbs for
theft, and other forms of mutilation as retaliation for inflicted injuries; dire forms of
execution (such as stoning to death for adultery); stabbing to death of a person with
the same knife the offender had used to kill his victims; and flogging for possessing
alcohol-all of which can draw negative attention domestically and internationally
to those sentences. See id. Second, application of sharia law in "northern Nigeria is
still often contaminated by local custom antithetical to women," id. at 588, complete
with archaic rules of evidence that are weighted against women defendants but do
not apply against men. See id. at 589.
169. The piece by Ostien and Dekker is a thoughtful one by individuals
familiar with the Nigerian legal system, one of whom, Philip Ostien, taught law for
many years at the University of Jos in the middle belt of Nigeria close to the
northern region. See id. at 606 n.1 (bio statement of Philip Ostien). The authors
surveyed three possibilities in the conclusion of their article. See id. at 604-06. The
first is that, pressed by their ardent supporters, the governors of northern sharia
states will carry out the backlog of pending sentences and even allow the imposition
of new sentences. Id. at 603. They ruled the probability of this occurrence as
"practically nil." Id. The second is that "[t]he sharia states will continue to muddle
along under the penal legislation now in place, finding various ways to limit and
mitigate the damage." Id. The authors ruled the probability of this second occurrence
"high over the near to medium term." Id. The third possibility the authors surveyed
was that
[t]he federal courts will rule that the penal legislation now in place is
unconstitutional. The penal law of all sharia states will revert to what it
was before sharia implementation started. All persons still in prison under
sentence of hudud [Arabic for punishment for serious crime] or qisas
[Arabic law of retaliation] will be released and no more such cases will
arise.
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nothing else, it adds a layer of complexity to a judicial system that
before 1999 remained nearly secular.170
Id. at 604. The authors ruled this probability "quite high in the not too distant
future." Id. The authors' assessment regarding the second possibility is the reason
why this article considers the adoption of sharia law as spelling a negative
implication for a Nigerian legal system that until 2000 remained mostly secular.
There is nothing to add to their first possibility since the probably of that occurrence
is "practically nil." Id. at 603. The same too for the third, since the probability of
that occurrence is "quite high in the not too distant future." Id. at 604. However, for
the second possibility, the projection is a high probability "over the near to medium
term" that the sharia states-and the Nigerian state-"will continue to muddle
along" over the sharia issue, just finding ways "to limit and mitigate the damage."
Id. at 603. To make matters worse, all these projections are speculative, especially
given their observation that "Nigeria's troubles are legion, and, along with the
North's most sincere Muslims, it will also take the sustained and cooperative efforts
of many other people of all religious and ethnic persuasions all over the country to
even begin to address them." Id. at 606. Another point that makes this issue
worrisome for judicial independence is the authors' observation that not only does
sharia law "continue[] as an official program of a number of northern state
governments," this law "is still advancing on various fronts." Id. at 602.
170. See id. A much broader occurrence looming beyond the court system,
which amplifies the upgrading of sharia into legal code in Northern Nigeria, is the
bloody campaign since 2009 by Boko Haram. See Farouk Chothia, Who are
Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists? BBC NEWS
(May 20, 2014),
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13809501. Boko Haram is an Islamic insurgency
organization whose mission is to eliminate the supposedly "evil" influence of
Western education through the imposition of sharia law in Nigeria. See LAUREN
PLOCH BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43558, NIGERIA'S BOKO HARAM:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1-3 (2014). "More than five thousand people have
been killed in Boko Haram-related violence"; additionally, "more than six million
people have been affected and more than 300,000 displaced." Id. at 3 (citation
omitted). Prodded by the Nigerian government and human rights groups, the U.S.
government under President Barack Obama, declared the group a terrorist
organization in November of 2013. Id. at 10. On April 15, 2014, the terrorist
organization kidnapped more than three hundred girls from their school dormitory in
Chibok, a remote town in northeastern Nigeria, in an action that drew the attention
of the international community. See Ishaan Tharoor, 8 Questions You Want
Answered about Nigeria's Missing Schoolgirls, WASH. POST (May 6, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/05/06/8-questions-youwant-answered-about-nigerias-missing-schoolgirls/. One Nigerian commentator tied
the kidnapping to the adoption of sharia law in Nigeria. See Sefi Atta, Too Many of
Nigeria's Women Are Targets-Not Just the Kidnapped Girls, TIME (May 19, 2014),
http://time.com/103531/Nigeria-boko-haram-sharia-law
(opining that "[w]hen
Nigerian states adopt sharia laws that are in their application blatantly unfavorable to
women, it creates an environment in which a terrorist group like Boko Haram
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A second factor of Nigerian politics, this one potentially positive,
is the invigoration of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice.' 7 '
This is an event of sub-regional dimension not confined to the national
borders of Nigeria. Nigeria played a critical leadership role in
founding ECOWAS in 1975.172 Nearly forty years later, its support is
still key to the maintenance of the organization.' 73 The Community

believes it has a right to do as it pleases with girls without prosecution"). At the very
least, these two events have re-kindled concerns regarding the role of religion in the
Nigerian public square.
171. See generally Karen J. Alter et al., A New InternationalHuman Rights
Courtfor West Africa: The ECO WAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT'L
L. 737 (2013) (applauding the pleasantly unexpected emergence of the ECOWAS
Court as a key human rights court).
172. See Economic Community of West African States, INTERNATIONAL
DEMOCRACY WATCH, http://www.intemationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/
economic-community-of-west-african-states- (last visited Dec. 17, 2014) (describing
the history and institutions of the organization). The organization was formed to
promote economic integration in "all fields of economic activity, particularly
industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources,
commerce, monetary and financial questions, [and] social and cultural matters"
among member-States.

ECOWAS

in Brief ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST

http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=abou
STATES,
AFRICAN
17, 2014). There are fifteen such members. See
Dec.
visited
(last
tLa&lang-en
ECOWAS Member States, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES,

http://www.ecowas.int/?lang-en (last visited Dec. 17, 2014). Besides Nigeria, the
members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, C6te d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger Republic, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo. Id. ECOWAS comprises four institutions: a Secretariat upgraded in 2006 into
a Commission; a Community Parliament; a financial institution, formerly the
ECOWAS Fund, now renamed the Bank for Investment and Development; and a
Community Court of Justice. Id.; ECO WAS Commission at a Glance, ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY

WEST

OF

AFRICAN

STATES,

http://www.comm.ecowas.int/

dept/index.php?id-p pl_commission&lang-en (last visited Dec. 17, 2014).
173. Femi Aribisala, ECOWAS Imperative for Nigeria, NIGERIAN
DEVELOPMENT

&

FINANCE

FORUM,

http://www.nigeriadevelopment

andfinanceforum.org/PolicyDialogue/Dialogue.aspx?Edition=63 (last visited Nov.
24, 2014). Nigeria comprises over fifty percent of the community's population, has a
gross domestic product ("GDP") larger than the combined GDP of all the other
ECOWAS states put together, and contributes nearly one-third of the community's
annual budget. Id. This is testament to Nigeria's endowments and reflective of
Nigeria's influence in the organization. The organization's headquarters, as well as
that of the Court, is located in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. See Economic Community of
West African States, INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY WATCH, supra note
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Court of Justice was established in 1991 as a permanent institution,
rather than an ad hoc tribunal, to "address complaints from member
states and institutions of ECOWAS, as well as issues relating to
defaulting nations." 1 74 The Community Court comprised a president,
chief registrar, and seven judges.' 75 In 2005, ECOWAS broadened the
Court's judicial jurisdiction to address the cases of human rights
violations "that occur in any member state." 76 The Community Court
has since assumed a level of activity in the adjudication of human
rights issues second to none in Africa, which legal scholars have
praised.' 77 ECOWAS' peacekeeping initiatives, designed to minimize
the regional impacts of the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone during
the 1990s, led to human rights abuses by peacekeeping forces.' 78
These violations highlighted the need in ECOWAS member-States,
including Nigeria, for conflict resolution procedures, and the necessity
for human rights as a guarantor of regional security.179
Nigerian Fourth Republic leaders also played an instrumental role
in the increase of judicial jurisdiction,' 80 and have shown no
(chronicling the history and institutions of the organization, including their
locations); Alter et al., supra note 171, at 748 n.69.
174. Id. See also Alter et al., supra note 171, at 745-48 (describing the factors
that impelled ECOWAS member-States to create the Community Court of Justice).
175. Economic Community of West African States, INTERNATIONAL
DEMOCRACY WATCH, supra note 172.

176. See Alter et al., supra note 171, at 748-58. See also Supplementary
Protocol amending the Preamble and Articles 1, 2, 9 and 30 of Protocol Relating to
the Community Court of Justice and Article 4 Paragraph I of the English Version of
the
Said
Protocol,
Jan.
19,
2005,
A/SP1/01/05,
A/P.1/7/91,
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/pdf files/supplementary-protocol.pdf (giving
the ECOWAS Community Court power over human rights issues).
177. See Alter et al., supra note 171, at 737-79. What sets this Court apart
from other sub-regional judicial tribunals, such as the East African Court of Justice,
the Tribunal of the South African Development Community, and the continentbased African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights, are its three distinctive features
of direct access for private parties, an unrestricted human rights jurisdiction, and no
requirement for a litigant to first exhaust domestic remedies. Id. at 753-56.
178. Id. at 772 (noting that these abuses include looting, expropriation, theft,
and sexual exploitation of women and children by peacekeepers).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 747 (stating that after taking office in 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo
(1999-2007) "increased the country's international profile, in part by reviving its
leadership of' ECOWAS).
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disapproval of Nigeria's active human rights jurisprudence. 1 8 1
Nigerian politicians under the Fourth Republic calculated that it was
in the country's national interest to support a permanent court charged
with responsibility for adjudicating the trade and related disputes of
economic integration, while simultaneously dealing with human rights
issues within national borders with potential to militate against
regional security, if left unaddressed.1 82 This is a matter in which both
human rights non-government organizations ("NGOs"), many of
whose advocacy led to the broadened role of the Court in human
rights within the region,' 83 and the Nigerian government, appear to
uncommonly agree.1 84 Part of the argument of the NGOs in
supporting an enlarged role for the Community Court of Justice in
human rights is that the Court's work is precisely necessary in a subregion like West Africa "where the judiciary is an arm of the
executive."' 8 5 A sub-regional outfit yet located right inside Nigeria,
the Community Court of Justice provides an alternative adjudicative
point for litigants, especially on human rights issues, while putting
pressure on Nigerian domestic courts in a manner that represents a
boon to judicial independence.

181. See id. at 758-61 (analyzing the Court's controversial intervention in a
Nigerian election dispute).
182. See id. at 772-75 (offering an explanation as to why the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice's decisions on human rights issues have come to
eclipse economic issues).
183. See id. at 750-53.
184. See id. at 761-65 (discussing Gambia's unsuccessful attempt to restrict
the ECOWAS Court's human rights jurisdiction).
185. Id. at 763.
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V. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?:1 86 FIVE PRACTICAL STEPS FOR
PROMOTING INCREASED JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA

There are five practical steps to the public good of judicial
independence or a truly independent judiciary, which this section
analyzes. These five steps are:
* maintaining civilian rule as an indispensable canvas for
any talk about progress on judicial independence;' 87
* supporting judicial independence from the non-judicial
branches of government; 8 8
* the judiciary's doing everything within its capacity to
promote judicial independence
("physician, heal
thyself!"); 189
* relentless pursuit of judicial reforms on a broad range of
issues; and
* building judicial independence with public participation, a
theme central to this article. 1 90
These components are illustrative, and are not meant to exhaust all the
possibilities for a complex country like Nigeria.'91 Further, without
186.

See MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE: CHAOS

OR COMMUNITY? (2010), for a poignant statement in civil rights, where this civil
rights icon laid out his thoughts, plans, and dreams for America's future on a range
of topics from the need for better jobs and higher wages to decent housing and
quality education. Dr. King's where-do-we-go-from-here expression applies here
because, like African Americans during the era of the Civil Rights Movement,
Nigerians find themselves at a crossroads, impelling them to choose between the
"chaos" of a dependent judiciary and the "community" signified in an independent
judiciary, with no option to straddle these two options.
187. See infra Part V.A. (commenting on the necessity to maintain civilian
rule as necessary step in growing judicial independence).
188. See infra Part V.B. (the non-judicial branches of the government
consisting of the President and his ministers, the National Assembly, and ruling
political parties).
189. See infra Part V.C. (showing how the judiciary can contribute to its own
independence by eschewing corruption and producing the public good of speedy
trials).
190. See, e.g., the discussion in infra V.D. (analyzing the strategy of building
judicial independence with public participation).
191.

See Nigeria, ETHNOLOGUE: LANUGUAGES OF THE WORLD, supra note 74

(explaining that Nigeria has one of the highest numbers of spoken languages of any
state in the world: over 527 languages, more than double the number for the U.S.
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dismissing the role of the state judiciaries and their possible impact on
judicial independence, the focus in this study is limited to the Nigerian
national government.192
A. MaintainingCivilian Rule
Maintaining civilian rule is the first strategy in building judicial
independence and promoting the rule of law in Nigeria. It is the
foundation for any sustained progress in judicial independence. True,
many of Nigeria's political institutions, such as the thirty-six-state
structure, 193 transfer of the country's national capital from Lagos to
Abuja,194 and adoption of the presidential system of government in
place of the parliamentary system,' 9 5 occurred during the years of
military rule. However, these changes were arguably a testament to
military domination of the political system. Prolonged military rule
had a severely negative effect on many political values necessary for
with nearly double the population of Nigeria). In fact, 7% of the world's languages
are spoken in Nigeria, the highest number of languages in any one country. Aka,
supra note 164, at 228-29.
192. The reference to the states is important for two reasons. First, the
discussion in supra Part III.B. (measuring judicial independence based on the
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices), indicated the particular problem that
the states and local governments pose on this issue. Second, and more positively,
under the Fourth Republic, some states led by "especially dynamic governors" are
"develop[ing] reputations for effective governance." DICKOVICK & EASTWOOD,
supra note 18, at 584 (citing Cross River State and Lagos State, in Southern Nigeria,
as examples). While conceding these variegated occurrences, focus on national
authority is justified by the capacity of the national government to set the tone on
many issues in many systems, especially in a still-centralized system like Nigeria.
See, e.g., AUGUSTINE A. IKEIN ET. AL., OIL, DEMOCRACY, AND THE PROMISE OF
TRUE FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA vii, x (2008) (pointing out that under Nigeria's
federal system, the national government "holds more power over the state and local
governments and also controls larger share of the federal revenues").
193. See TOYIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, A HISTORY OF NIGERIA
192-93 (2008) (portraying the evolution of the country's thirty-six states and their
locations).
194. Federal Capital Abuja, ONLINE NIGERIA, http://www.onlinenigeria.com/
links/abujaadv.asp?blurb=387 (last visited Dec. 13, 2014) (providing background
information on the logic behind the relocation to Abuja as well as the personalities
that planned the movement).
195. See Diamond, supra note 2, at 45-49 (discussing the transition to the
Second Republic from 1975 to 1979).
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the growth of the rule of law, including judicial independence.
Political corruption, symptomatic of the absence of the rule of law,
reached new heights during the two long stretches of military rule for
nearly thirty years. 196
Additionally, Nigerian military rulers were dictatorial leaders who
brook no restrictions on their political control, no matter the sources
those restrictions came from, whether from the constitution, statute,
the legislature, political parties, public opinion, or sometimes even the
judiciary.' 9 7 Accordingly, they seldom enforced any court order that
they did not like. Instead, "executive lawlessness," marked by utter
disrespect of judicial institutions and contempt for judicial rulings,
took root during the period of military rule in Nigeria.198 Concededly,
the quality of democratic rule under the Fourth Republic has been
distinctively low.' 99 Even so, civilian regimes are preferable because
196. See James Rupert, Corruption Flourished in Abacha's Regime, WASH.
POST
A01
(June
9,
1998),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/stories/corrupt060998.htm (reporting on the magnitude of
corruption that marked the military government under General Sani Abacha from
1993 to 1998); see also CHINUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH NIGERIA 42 (1983)

(pointing out that "from fairly timid manifestations in the 1960s, corruption has
grown bold and ravenous as, with each succeeding regime, our public servants have
become more reckless and blatant").
197.

See JOHN MCCORMICK, COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN TRANSITION 417

(2013) (observing that "[m]ilitary governments typically suspend political parties,
abolish civilian political institutions, and sometimes use military tribunals"). See
also FALOLA ET. AL., supra note 98, at 151-61 (describing the militarization of

federal institutions, including the judiciary, which occurred during military regimes).
198. See, e.g., Mike A. A. Ozekhome, The Nigerian Judiciary - 15 Years of
Democracy,

POINTBLACKNEWS.COM,

http://pointblanknews.com/pbn/articles-

opinions/the-nigerian-judiciary-15-years-of-democracy/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
The term "executive lawlessness" originated from the case Ojukwu v. Governor of
Lagos State, [1986] NWLR (Nigeria), where the Supreme Court viewed the action
of the Lagos State Government in forcibly ejecting a Nigerian citizen from his
residence while his suit against the State government was still pending as amounting
to "executive lawlessness."
199. See, e.g., Aka, Nigeria Since May 1999, supra note 154, at 209-76
(assessing the first four years of the Obasanjo government); Aka, supra note 164, at
225-79 (stressing U.S. support for Nigerian democracy). One citizen under Nigeria's
Fourth Republic made the following observation: "When we were in the military
regime, we didn't get anything from the government but we had peace. Now we are
in a democracy, we don't get anything from the government and we do not get
peace." MEREDITH, supra note 97, at 582. For the foregoing reasons, in this article,
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of the opportunity they afford, compared to repressive military
regimes, for experimentation in self-governance necessary for the
possible growth of judicial independence and entrenchment of a rule
of law culture. To play on Winston Churchill's famous dictum about
democracy as the worst form of government, 20 0 for judicial
independence and the rule of law, the worst civilian government in
Nigeria is better than the most benevolent military rule. Nigerians are
notable for their "profound commitment to personal freedom and
political participation." 20 1 Perception of military rule in Nigeria as
aberrational is so widespread that such rule is often justified on the
grounds that the military is cleaning up the mess in the political
system to clear the ground for a timely return to civilian rule. 202 The
challenge today "is to translate this strong attachment among the
population to the idea of democracy into prolonged democratic
rule."20 3
B. Supportfrom the Non-JudicialBranches of the Government
Assuming the existence of civilian rule, Nigeria next needs
support of the non-judicial branches of government to achieve
increased judicial independence. Under the country's presidential
system of government, these non-judicial or political wings of the
government are the executive branch, which consists of the President
the author has deliberately refrained from denominating the Nigerian political
system under the Fourth Republic as a true democracy.
200. See WINSTON CHURCHILL, CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE
COLLECTION OF QUOTATIONs 574 (Richard M. Langworth, ed. 2008) (emphasis
added) ("Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world
of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has
been said that democracy is the worst form of Government exceptfor all those other
forms that have been triedfrom time to time.").
201. Diamond, supra note 2, at 33. Diamond noted that even during military
misrules, the "social infrastructure of democracy" embedded in "a free press, a
rapidly expanding education system, a sophisticated legal system, and a diverse
array of autonomous social, cultural, and economic organizations," grew quietly and
steadily. Id. Moreover, Nigeria "represents an irrepressible social pluralism that
cannot be effectively managed by authoritarian means." Id.
202. Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic
Reconciliation in the New Century, 14 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L. J. 327, 352
(2000).
203. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol45/iss1/2

50

Aka: Judicial Independence under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Problems

50

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

and his ministers, and the legislative branch, which consists of the
National Assembly and its 469 members.2 0 4 There is some suspicion
in some quarters that many politicians in Nigeria and other African
countries find it "convenient to have a crooked and malleable
judiciary than an independent one." 205 Yet, individually and
collectively, these members of the political branches have a legal and
moral obligation to support judicial independence as a complement to
the rule of law and democratic practice. Politicians must eschew the
tendency to view the judiciary as an extension of the government,
rather than as an independent branch. Politicians "have a duty to
provide for the execut[ion] of judgment of the Court." 206 Given the
important role that an independent judiciary plays in deepening
democracy and generating stability in a multi-ethnic society like
Nigeria, all public officials must check their impulse to control judges,
and demonstrate a commitment to judicial independence that goes
beyond verbal assertions. 20 7 The next question is how? To answer
that question, this article analyzes the individual role of the executive

204. See Africa: Nigeria, in CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORLD
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world(2014),
FACTBOOK
factbook/geos/ni.html [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK]. The National Assembly
comprises two chambers: a Senate made up of 109 members, with three members
each from the thirty-six states, and one member representing the capital, Abuja. Id.
The House of Representatives is made up of 360 members elected based on
Kano and Lagos States have the most
proportional representation. Id.
representation, each with twenty-four members, while the Federal Capital Territory
has the least representation in the chamber with two members. Id.
205.

ROBERT CALDERIsI, THE TROUBLE WITH AFRICA: WHY FOREIGN AID

ISN'T WORKING 89 (2006) (identifying this factor as a reason why many of the
efforts to clean up the judicial system in Africa "have borne little fruit"). Similarly,
one renowned Nigerian lawyer commented ruefully that there was a time
when a lawyer could predict the likely outcome of a case because of the
facts, the law and the brilliance of the lawyers that handled the case.
Today, things have changed and nobody can be sure. Nowadays,
politicians would text the outcome of the judgment to their party men
before the judgment is delivered and prepare their supporters ahead of
time for celebration.
Nwokeoma, supra note 12 (emphasis added) (quoting Abe Balolala, a distinguished
legal practitioner in Nigeria).
206. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 7.
207. See Oko, supra note 12, at 75-76.
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and legislative branches of government in generating judicial
independence.
1. The Executive Branch
The IBA's Minimum Standards advised that "the judiciary as a
whole should enjoy autonomy and collective independence vis-a-vis
the Executive." 208 The President and his ministerS209 can lead the way
in the journey to increased independence and enthronement of a
culture based on the rule of law by faithfully enforcing the law and
resisting the temptation of the arbitrariness embedded in "executive
lawlessness." 210 Along with his ministers, the President should also
refrain from piling up undue pressure on the judiciary for favorable
judicial outcome, whether overtly or covertly. 211 More than
constitutional provisions or platitudinous assurances of politicians, "it
is the attitude of the executive and its willingness to respect the
integrity of the judicial process and refrain from interfering with the
judiciary that nurtures the independence of the judiciary." 212 Judges
208. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 2.
209.

CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 5,

§ 1 (providing

that the executive powers of the federation shall be vested in the President and may
be exercised by him either directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of
the Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation).
210. See supra note 198, and corresponding text for the origin of the term
executive lawlessness.
211. See IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 16 ("The ministers of the
government shall not exercise any form of pressure on judges, whether overt or
covert, and shall not make statements which adversely affect the independence of
individual judges or of the Judiciary as a whole."); Oko, supra note 12 (utilizing the
terms intimidation and manipulation). See also ELLEN GRIGSBY, ANALYZING
POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 43-57

(5th ed. 2012)

(identifying four types of power in political science: force, persuasion, manipulation,
and exchange). Overt pressures, involving physical means (such as intimidation) are
more likely to create problems for judicial independence than covert ones (such as
manipulation). See id. at 55 (defining manipulation as present where power is
cloaked, adding that "[i]f you are persuaded, you feel it; if you are manipulated, you
do not feel it because you do not know anything has happened. The implication is
disturbing: How can you resist something if you do not know it exists?"). Between
intimidation and manipulation, intimidation (which could include threat to the lives
of disagreeable judges) would be the pressure that would pose more headaches for
judicial independence.
212. Oko, supra note 12, at 73.
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must not "sacrifice[] the dictates of justice in an attempt to appease the
executive," or be made "to choose between commitment to justice and
risking the ire of the executive." 2 13 Judges who are "fearful of the
executive" will be unable to muster and "exercise the level of
independence needed for them" to resolve impartially and
dispassionately the disputes before them.2 14
2. The NationalAssembly
Some of the counsel or recommendations above to the executive
branch apply with equal force to the legislators. Members of the
National Assembly must refrain from putting undue pressure on the
judiciary. Additionally, as the branch of the government that holds
the "purse" of the people, 215 the National Assembly could take the
lead in solving problems with funding. Inadequate funding and
inadequate remuneration of judges rank among the many problems
confronting the Nigerian judiciary. 216 Commentators familiar with the
Nigerian legal system decry the "gross underfund[ing]" the judiciary
has faced and still faces under the Fourth Republic since 1999.217
Working with the president, the National Assembly has a duty "to
provide adequate financial resources to allow for the due
administration of justice," 218 as well as to ensure that "judicial salaries

213. Id. at 74.
214. Id. at 73. Oko points out that "[t]he climate of intimidation,
manipulation[,] and control of the judiciary by the executive often forces judges to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis with potentially disastrous consequences for the
integrity and independence of the judiciary." Id.
215.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating the Executive

holds "the sword of the community," and the legislature "the purse," whereas the
judiciary, having neither "force nor will," is left with "merely judgment" which, key
for the purpose here, it must depend on the assistance of the Executive to enforce).
216. See Foluso Ogunmodede, F[ederal] G[overnment]'s Underfunding of
Judiciary is a Threat to Justice Delivery System-Adekoya, NEW TELEGRAPH (Feb.
10, 2014) http://newtelegraphonline.com/fgs-underfunding-of-judiciary-is-threat-tojustice-delivery-system-adekoya/ (interviewing Funke Adekoya, then newly-elected
president of the Nigerian Bar Association, who lamented the national government's
underfunding of the judiciary as a threat to the justice delivery system).
217. Id.; see also Adedimeji, supra note 139.
218. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 10. See also id. § 13 (stating that
"[c]ourt services should be adequately financed by the relevant government").
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and pensions shall be adequate and .. . regularly adjusted to account
for price increases, independent of executive control." 2 19 The
members of the National Assembly, along with their political parties,
should lead the way, in partnership with the President, in streamlining
the constitutional protections relating to judicial independence. The
most important single service the executive and legislative branches
can render to judicial independence in the Fourth Republic is to
change the constitution to provide for the fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary along the lines suggested in Part III.A. of this article. 220
3. PoliticalParties
Political parties in Nigeria are "private [institutions] in the public
service" 22 1 that must "conform with the provisions of Chapter II of
this [1999] Constitution."222 Some of the admonitions above with
219. Id. § 14.
220. See supra Part III.A. While some of the changes arguably will be
exacting, others are much less so. One such non-onerous change relates to the names
of two agencies in Appendix B.: the National Judicial Council and the National
Judicial Institute. See infra Appendix B. The first exercises disciplinary control over
judges, while the second is charged with the responsibility of improving and
rationalizing judicial services and products. Id. Only one word in the full names
(Council and Institute) and one letter in the acronyms (C and 1) separate the two
organizations. Id. This occurrence is potentially confusing and the two will need
more distinct names. The uninitiated reader will have to make a conscious mental
effort each time he or she comes across one of the two organizations to tell them
apart. The only legislative action needed here is to give these two organizations
with important functions two dissimilar names that are less likely to confuse readers,
both those versed with Nigerian legal events as well as those less familiar with those
events.
221. New York University Presents 175 Facts About NYU, NYU,
http://www.nyu.edu/library/bobst/research/arch/175/pages/motto2.htm (last visited
Dec. 16, 2014) (motto of New York University in New York). The Nigerian
Constitution inelegantly defines politicalparties to include "any association whose
activities include canvassing for votes in support of a candidate for election to the
office of President, Vice-President, Governor, Deputy Governor or membership of a
legislative house or of a local government council." CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA
(1999), supra note 60, art. 229.
222. CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 224 (stipulating
that "[t]he programme as well as the aims and objects of a political party shall
conform with the provisions of Chapter II of this Constitution"). Chapter II of the
Constitution embodies the "fundamental objectives and directive principles of state
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respect to the executive and legislative branches of government can go
as well to political parties. For one thing, these parties provide the
platform and support that make possible the election of the
officeholders who form the executive and political branches. This is
particularly the case with the PDP.22 3 The PDP has held the
presidency since the re-start of civilian rule in 1999, has held the
majority of seats in the National Assembly, and controls many of the
state governorships and legislatures in most of the thirty-six states. 224
C. Physician,Heal Thyself'
As an equal branch with the executive and legislative branches of
the government, judges individually and the judiciary collectively are
responsible for judicial independence and its complementary ethics of
the rule of law. 225 There are two means through which judges can
contribute to their own independence. The first is via the devices of
self-restraint embedded in the doctrines of standing, mootness,
ripeness, and the command to abjure advisory opinions. 226 The
policy," consisting of twelve articles, 13-24, covering a wide range of issues,
including fundamental obligations of the government, economic objectives, political
objectives, educational objectives, environmental objectives, foreign policy
objectives, social objectives (including support for judicial independence),
obligations of the mass media, national ethics, directives on Nigerian cultures, and
duties of citizens. See id. arts. 13-24. However, the provisions are aspirational, rather
than justiciable mandates in the sense that citizens cannot sue for remedies in the
event of violations of any of these provisions. See Aka, supra note 154, at 216
(describing human rights in the Nigerian context).
223. See Oarhe Osumah & Augustine Ikelegbe, The Peoples DemocraticParty
and Governance in Nigeria,1997-2007, 3 J. SOCIAL SCI. 185-99 (2009), availableat
http://www.krepublishers.com/02-Joumals/JSS/JSS-1 9-0-000-09-Web/JSS- 19-3-00
0-09-Abst-PDF/JSS-19-3-185-2009-777-Osumah-O/JSS-19-3-185-2009-777-Osum
ah-O-Tt.pdf (examining the governance role of the party from 1999 to 2007).
224. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 204.
225. See IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 43 (enjoining judges to "take
collective action to protect their judicial independence and to uphold their
positions").
226. DOUG LINDER, Exploring Constitutional Conflicts: Constitutional
Limitations on the Judicial Power, U. MO.-KAN. CITY SCH. L. (2004),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/caseorcontroversy.htm
(examining the limitations stemming from the "cases or controversies" requirements
under art. III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution). The judiciary uses these devices to take
measures in a manner that no other branch of the government can, both to promote
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second, the focus of the ensuing discussion, is by eschewing
corruption as well as facilitating fair and speedy trials for litigants
who appear before them. The judiciary is only as good as the men and
women who run it. In other words, "[n]o matter how well structured,
properly staffed, and adequately funded the Judiciary may be, and no
matter how good the rules governing its operation and practice are,"
judicial independence will remain mere talk if the persons who run the
judiciary lack integrity. 227 The discussion that follows is devoted to
this second means.
1. Corruption
Corruption consists of a range of antisocial practices, from bribery
to embezzlement to theft of all sizes, which, occurs when public
officials use their public offices for personal gains. 228 For the purpose

its own independence and to benefit society, without threatening the executive and
legislative branches of government. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803). In Marbury v. Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court gained power that reduced
its fragility as the least dangerous branch of government, by self-restraint indicated
by the refusal to compel the handover of a commission via the writ of mandamus
that it knew the incoming president would not enforce, on the ground that the law
enabling the petitioner to bring his claim to the Court exceeded the judiciary's
powers! See id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 215 (Alexander
Hamilton) (noting that the judiciary "may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor
WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments").
227. Ogunye, supra note 12, at 1; see also Oko, supra note 12, at 48 (stating
that "however sound its structure may be on paper," a judicial system will "function
poorly in practice," if judges are not "competent and upright and free to judge
without fear or favor"); Chukwudifu A. Oputa, Judicial Ethics and Canons of
Judicial Conduct, in JUSTICE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JUSTICE EUGENE UBAEZONU 203 (C. C. Nweze, ed. 2002) (opining that both the Bar
and the public at large have "nothing but contempt for an incompetent judge").
228. NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY
AFRICA 187-88 (3d ed. 1999) (commenting on the downsides of patron-client
relationships in Africa). See also JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND CLEANUPS (2010) (discussing the symptoms and

remedies for corruption in Africa). Robert Calderisi equated corrupt judges to the
one-party and military dictators from the post-independence era who wreaked havoc
on the political and economic system in African countries. See CALDERISI, supra
205, at 89 (emphasis added) ("A corrupt judicial system is another millstone around

Africa's neck. In fact, dishonestjudges are as bad as the dictators.").
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of this article, corruption is divisible into criminal and ethical (or
judicial) categories. Criminal corruption is corruption forbidden by
the criminal code. 229 It is the omnibus category of corruption that
afflicts all sections of the Nigerian population, including the
judiciary.2 30 It is corruption as an "engine of activity," without which
even ordinary business transactions grind to a complete halt. 23 1 The
most common form of criminal corruption among judges is bribery,
and the most common form since the formation of the Fourth
Republic is bribery in election tribunal cases. 232 Ethical corruption or
judicial corruption occurs when a judge violates the code of judicial

229.

See DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: EVERYDAY

DECEPTION

AND

POPULAR DISCONTENT

IN NIGERIA (2008)

(portraying

the

widespread nature of corruption in the daily lives of many Nigerians). The Nigerian
journalist Peter Enahoro once painted a portrait of "the complete Nigerian"
bureaucrat gently soaked in corruption:
The Complete Nigerian civil servant, unlike his predecessor, is not selfeffacing behind an array of codes titles. You meet him here, you see him
there, and you talk to him yonder. He is eager to make your acquaintance.
He takes you into little corners to confide in you. For instance, he tells you
how much it would cost you to have yourfile speeded up, which I think is
very nice.
PETER ENAHORO, THE COMPLETE NIGERIAN

121

(1992)

(emphasis

added).

Regulations aimed at combatting criminal corruption in Nigeria include the Nigerian
Criminal Code Act (1990), Cap. 77, § 98; and Corrupt Practices and Other Related
Offenses Act (2000) (Nigeria), §§ 8-9. Additionally, the Nigerian Constitution
declares that "the state shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of office."
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 15, § 5.
230. See SMITH, supra note 229.
231. JULIUS 0. IHONVBERE & TIMOTHY SHAW, ILLUSIONS OF POWER: NIGERIA
IN TRANSITION 151 (1998).
232. See Nwokeoma, supra note 12 (citing a statement attributed to former

Supreme Court Justice Kayode Eso, to the effect that due to corruption in election
petition cases, many of the judges who try these cases "are not just millionaires as
we were told but billionaires" in Nigerian currency). Nigeria's 1999 Constitution
creates separate tribunals for election cases. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999),

supra note 60, art. 285, § 1 (vesting election tribunals with "original jurisdiction to
hear and determine petition" regarding elections into the National Assembly, State
Governorships, and elections into state legislative assemblies). Thus, the focus here
is not on electoral fraud, although the author does not minimize the problem this
form of behavior poses for the judiciary and the society at large, as the just-quoted
statement of Justice Eso indicates.
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ethics. 233 Another example occurs when a judge injects arbitrariness
into the judicial process 234 by "assum[ing] jurisdiction where there is
none," "declin[ing] jurisdiction where there is," 235 or abuses or
misuses the issuance of ex parte orders. 23 6 Ethical corruption is an
endemic problem in the Nigerian judiciary. 237
233. Nigerian judges are bound by a code of conduct or set of ethical norms.
See Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers (1998) (Nigeria), available at
http://www.nigeria-law.org/CodeOfConductForJudicialOfficers.htm.
Additionally,
upon appointment, a judge also takes an oath to "discharge my duties, and perform
my functions honestly, to the best of my ability and faithfully in accordance with
[Nigeria's Constitution] and the law ... that I will not allow my personal interest to
influence my official conduct or official decision." CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA
(1999), 7th sched. (embodying a template of this judicial oath). See Oko, supra note
12, at 25 (referring to ethical corruption as "a vicious dynamic in which judges trade
in justice for favors and persons").
234. Niki Tobi, Code of Conduct and ProfessionalEthicsfor JudicialOfficers
in Nigeria, in JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HON. JUSTICE ANTHONY

I. IGUH 82, 83 (J. 0. Iruku & I. A. Umezulike, eds. 2004). In the memorable
language of one Nigerian judge:
[A corrupt judge] is the greatest enemy of the judicial process. A corrupt
judge is blind to the truth. He is incapable of searching for the truth in the
judicial process. His mind is diseased and he is incapable of doing justice
in the matter before him. He likes the party who has given him the bribe.
He hates the party who has not given him the bribe. He therefore gives
judgment to the party he likes and gives judgment against the party he
hates.
Id. In contrast, a good judge exhibits a sound exposition of the law and is able to
resolve the issues in controversy before him impartially, little influenced by
extraneous considerations, such as bias and prejudice. Oko, supra note 12, at 19 n.47
(citing retired Nigerian Supreme Court Justice Nnaemeka-Agu). Honest judges
"inspire the confidence of [Nigerians] in the court system and retain the respect of
even those who lost in [a] lawsuit in their courts." Chukwudifu A. Oputa, Toward
Greater Efficiency in the Dispensation of Justice in Nigeria, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND
STABILITY IN NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUSTICE KAYODE ESQ. 1, 30 (Yemi

Akinseye-George, ed. 1993).
235. Oko, supra note 12, at 28 (quoting Justice Muhammed M. Akanbi, a
retired President of the Court of Appeal).
236. Id. at 31. An ex parte order is a legitimate tool used in many court
systems to preserve the right of the parties in a lawsuit pending the hearing of the
case. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 399 (abridged 6th ed. 1991) (defining such
order as one "granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and
without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely interested"). However, in
Nigeria many judges have used this product of legal emergency to award judgment
arbitrarily behind the back of the defendant, effectively converting this judicial
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Whether criminal or ethical, corruption leads to inefficient use of
judicial resources.23 8 As the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime
indicated in 2004, "Corruption in the judiciary may turn out to be
more harmful [than corruption in other branches of government]
because it could undermine the credibility, efficiency, productivity,
trust, and confidence of the public in the judiciary as the epitome of
integrity." 239 During the period of military rule before 1999, the
Nigerian government set up several commissions of inquiry designed
to reduce corruption and promote efficiency within the judiciary.2 4 0
technique into, as one former Nigerian Chief Justice regretfully observed, "a
bulldozer for the demolition of substantive justice." Oko, supra note 12, at 31
(quoting former Chief Justice Mohammed Bello). The misuse of ex parte orders
goes back to the days of military rule in Nigeria. See Basil Ugochukwu, The
PathologyofJudicialization:Politics, Corruption,and the Courts in Nigeria, 4 LAW
& DEV. REV. 58, 76 (2011). General Babangida, military dictator from 1985 to 1993,
annulled the presidential election of June 12, 1993 ostensibly to "protect our legal
system and the judiciary from being ridiculed, both nationally and internationally."
Id. Before Babangida's announcement, no fewer than six courts from different parts
of the country issued ex parte orders, mostly contradictory, with respect to the
conduct of the election. Id.
237.

PETER O.E. BASSEY, THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY: THE DEPARTING GLORY

38 (2000). Bassey, a former high court judge, identified two types of corruption:
People who accept money to give justice to the highest bidder. . . . The
other type of corruption is when you have a case against the government.
This is where the greatest danger lies. Most of the judges will find
'grounds' to give judgment in favor of the government.
Id.; see also Oko, supra note 12, at 73 (observing that "[m]ost judges have
succumbed to the notion that career development depends on how they rule,
especially in high-profile cases involving the government").
238. Efficiency is defined in public administration as the ability to maximize
output for a given input of scarce resources or to minimize input for a given output.
MICHAEL E. MILAKOVICH & GEORGE J. GORDON, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN

AMERICA 197 (11th ed. 2013). Put simply, it is the ability to "obtain[] the maximum
benefit or gain possible from a given investment of resources." Id. at 149.
239. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, ASSESSMENT OF JUSTICE SYSTEM
INTEGRITY AND CAPACITY IN THREE NIGERIAN STATES 57 (May 2004),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/corruption-nigeriajustice-sector-asses
sment_2004-05.pdf.
240. Oluyemi Osinbajo, Sub-National Reform Efforts: The Lagos State
Experience, in TRANSPARENCY INT'L,, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007:
CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 146 (2007). In 1994, the military regime under
General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) set up a panel of inquiry headed by Kayode Eso,
a retired justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court, to look into the activities of the
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The NJI was born in 1991 in the heyday of military rule.2 4 1 The NJI
devised the 1998 Code of Judicial Officers,242 and was charged with
the responsibility for streamlining and rationalizing judicial resources
in the country. 243
A 2007 survey of nearly 3,000 businesses conducted by the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission ("EFCC"), 244 and the
Natural Bureau of Statistics, revealed "Nigerian courts of law receive
the biggest bribes [per transaction] from citizens among all institutions
in which corruption is rampant." 245 Public knowledge of widespread
judiciary and make recommendations to the government. Id. The panel
recommended a series of reforms aimed at minimizing corruption within the
judiciary, including the indictment of 47 judges for alleged corruption,
incompetence, dereliction of duty, lack of productivity, and corrupt use of ex parte
orders. Id. The military regime failed to implement the recommendations. Id.
Following the return to civilian rule on May 29, 1999, the government set up another
panel to review the work of the Eso panel. Id. Based on the report of this second
panel, some of the indicted judges were either dismissed or mandatorily retired. Id.
241. See Nat'l Jud. Institute Decree No. 28 (1991), § 3(2) (a), (b) (Nigeria)
(establishing the organization). See also Appendix B. (listing the agencies tied to
judicial independence in Nigeria).
242. See Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers, supra note 233.
243. Nat'l Jud. Institute Decree No. 28 (1991) (Nigeria), supra note 241. The
functions of the organization include to: conduct courses for all categories ofjudicial
officers and their supporting staff with a view to expanding and improving their
overall knowledge and performance in their different sections of service, as well as
provide continuing education for all categories of judicial officers by undertaking,
organizing, conducting, and facilitating study courses, lecturers, seminars,
workshops, conferences, and other programs related to judicial education. Id.
244. The EFCC is an anti-corruption agency, established in 2004. See The
Establishment

Act,

ECONOMIC

AND

FINANCIAL

CRIMES

COMMISSION,

https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/index.php/about-efcc/the-establishment-act (last visited
Dec. 17, 2014). The governing law, which established the Commission, mandates it
to combat financial and economic crimes, specifically to prevent, investigate,
prosecute, and penalize economic and financial crimes. Id.
245. Nwokeoma, supra note 12. The other corruption-infested institutions
mentioned in the report, all of which the judiciary bested, were the police, revenue
officials, and customs officials. Id. At any rate, Nigerians generally have low trust
for the "cleanliness" or integrity of their governments. See Global States of Mind:
New
Metrics for
World
Leaders,
GALLUP
6
(Oct.
2012),
http://www.gallup.com/services/176381/global-states-mind-new-metrics-world-lead
ers.aspx. To the contrary, a Gallup Poll in 2012 of countries in the world showed
that 94% of Nigerians perceived their government to be corrupt. Id. Nigeria was
bested only by Kenya, where 96% of the citizens believed their government to be
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abuse by judges of their judicial offices can undermine public
confidence in the judiciary as the "epitome of integrity." 246 A
judiciary tainted by corruption as much as other bywords of
corruption, such as the Nigerian police, discourages commentators,
such as Joel Nwokeoma, who expressed dismay that the only
institution in the society that should be "the last hope of the common
man" and a "bulwark" in the fight against corruption is also part of the

problem. 247
A final issue related to this topic of judicial corruption is the
balance between judicial independence and accountability that can
arise when meting out punishment for corruption by judges. Judicial
independence and accountability constitute "the twin goals of the
judiciary," 248 but tension exists between the two; just as judges need
independence, they are also accountable for the power or authority
that they use. "Judicial independence does not render the judge free
from public accountability." 249 This is because corruption threatens
judicial independence in that it results in "final decisions based on

corrupt. Id. The country with the most trust regarding the cleanliness of their
government was Singapore, where only a single-digit 5% believed their government
to be corrupt. Id.
246. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 239, at 57; see also
Chukwudifu A. Oputa, In Search of a Disciplined Society Through Law (Feb. 16,
1986) (unpublished manuscript), quoted in Okechukwu Oko, Problems and
Challenges of Lawyering in Developing Societies, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 569, 637 n.366
(2004) (stating that corruption "snap[s] the brittle bond of confidence uniting our
people to the court system"). Perception of judicial corruption is so deeply rooted in
Nigeria that certain litigants even "ascribe corrupt motives to honest judges who
render decisions [these litigants] find objectionable." Oko, supra note 12, at 31.
Although regrettable, the occurrence is understandable. As Professor Oko posits,
"[iln an atmosphere rendered already paranoid by stories of corruption, citizens
believe every allegation of judicial corruption, however baseless or unfounded." Id.
247. See Nwokeoma, supra note 12.
248. Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote For This Judge Again ": Judicial
Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected
Judges, 106 WEST VA. L. REv. 1, 5 (2003).

249. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 33; see also Emily Fied van Tassel,
Resignationsand Removals: A History of FederalJudicialService-and Disservice
1789-1992, 142 UNIV. PENN. L. REv. 333, 334 (1993) (pointing out that "judicial
independence was probably not intended to trump judicial accountability for
misbehavior").

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

61

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2014], Art. 2

2014]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

61

considerations other than proper application of legal principles." 250
The challenge therefore is how to "resolve[] judicial corruption while
preserving judicial independence"251 or how to "balanc[e] judicial
independence and accountability." 252 Thus, judges who engage in
criminal or ethical corruption must be punished and held accountable
for their illegitimate use of power. This can also deter other judges
who would otherwise engage in the same behavior. In Nigeria, the
NJC, established under the 1999 Constitution, is the body that makes
recommendations relating to the discipline of judges.2 5 3
Holding judges accountable for corrupt acts without
compromising judicial independence demands that the NJC proceed
with "utmost care" when the Council investigates allegations of
judicial misconduct.25 4 Many citizens expect the government to act
speedily and vigorously to punish judicial corruption, but many also
want investigations of alleged acts of judicial corruption to be
conducted fairly and respectfully, with due sensitiveness for judicial
independence.2 5 5 Maintaining a balance between the two values
ensures, for example, that legal errors or a different reading of the law
would not be equated with corruption. "It is not unethical to be
imperfect, and it would be unfair to sanction a judge for not being
infallible while making hundreds of decisions often under
pressure."256 To the contrary, "[j]udges should always be free to state

250. Jon Mills, Principlesfor Constitutions and Institutions in Promotingthe
Rule ofLaw, 16 FL. J. INT'L L. 127 (2003).
251. J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving
Judicial Independence: Comparative Perspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341
(1998).
252. Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Errors and JudicialMisconduct:
Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1245
(2004).
253. See Appendix B. (spotlighting the agencies tied to judicial independence
in Nigeria). See also CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, arts. 21(b),
(d).
254. Oko, supra note 12, at 59. As Professor Oko puts it, the NJC must "be
careful not to allow unsatisfied litigants and mischievous lawyers to use the judicial
disciplinary process to harass and intimidate judges." Id. at 62.
255. Id. at 59-60.
256. Gray, supra note 252, at 1246-47.
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their good-faith understanding of the law without fear of sanctions or
repercussions."257
Applying these concepts to judicial independence in Nigeria, the
NJC "must maintain a delicate balance between enforcing disciplinary
standards so that judges do not violate their judicial oath and allowing
judges sufficient autonomy and independence." 2 5 8 In more practical
terms, it may not "act in ways that compromise judicial independence
and stifle creativity. "259 Given the nature of the adjudication process
and the understanding that judges sometimes reach wrong conclusion
or unknowingly misinterpret the law, the NJC should not equate
misreading of the law with corruption. 26 0 Instead, "[j]udges should
always be free to state their good-faith understanding of the law
without fear of sanctions or repercussions," and erroneous decisions
should be corrected through the appeals process, not via the judicial
disciplinary process.261
257. Oko, supra note 12, at 61. See also Steven Lubet, JudicialDiscipline and
JudicialIndependence, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 59 (1998) (stating that judicial
independence "[i]s most gravely threatened when judges face sanctions ... based
upon the merits of a ruling"). As the U.S. Supreme Court advised in Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), a judge's "[e]rror may be corrected on appeal, but he
should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation
charging malice or corruption." Id. The Court reasoned that "[i]mposing such a
burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision making,
but to intimidation." Id. See also Jeffrey M. Sharman, Judicial Ethics:
Independence, Impartiality, and Integrity, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK (1996),
("So long as
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=991625
judicial rulings are made in good faith and in an effort to follow the law as the judge
understands it, the usual safeguard against legal error is appellate review."); Randy
J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, JudicialDiscipline: Independence with Accountability,
5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117, 129 (2000) ("[A]n erroneous legal ruling that is made
in good faith is not unethical judicial conduct.").
258. Oko, supra note 12, at 60-61. Sometimes, even a reprimand, the mildest
level of judicial sanction, can threaten the integrity and moral standing of a judge.
See, e.g., Ruffo v. Conseil de la Magistrature [1995] S.C.R. 267, 341 (Can.)
(Sopinka, J., dissenting) ("A reprimand is an extremely serious punishment for a
judge. A reprimanded judge is a weakened judge: such a judge will find it difficult
to perform judicial duties and will be faced with a loss of confidence on the part of
the public and litigants.").
259. Oko, supra note 12, at 61.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 61-62. Professor Oko observed that the prospect of dragging judges
before the NJC for decisional errors will undermine judicial independence, driving

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

63

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2014], Art. 2

2014]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER NIGERIA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

63

In sum, the IBA's Minimum Standards advise that "[a] judge
should always behave in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of
his office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary," 262
by, for example, "not sit[ting] in a case where there is a reasonable
suspicion of bias or potential bias," 263 and "avoid[ing] any course of
conduct which might give rise to an appearance of partiality." 264
Judges who engage in any of these behaviors violate the norms of
judicial independence. Irrespective of which shape of misconduct a
judge engages in,265 corrupt acts by judges are an affront to the rule of

law. 266
Additionally, the lack of jury trials in Nigeria means that issues
such as witness credibility, testimonial evidence, and evidentiary
relevance, typically exercised by jurors in jury systems, reside
exclusively within the power of the judges. 267 The enormous power
granted to Nigerian judges makes them "the ultimate protector" in

judges to become timid and less creative in their reasoning. Id. at 62. He advised
that the NJC's disciplinary mechanisms be "limited to violations of the Code of
Conduct for Judicial Officers [i.e., ethical misconducts] and criminal offenses." Id.
at 62.
262. IBA MIN. STDS., supra note 22, § 40.
263. Id. § 44.
264. Id. § 45.
265. See supra notes 229-237 and corresponding texts (distinguishing between
criminal and ethical corruptions). What might motivate a judge to engage in corrupt
behavior varies from judge to judge, but may generally involve any one or more of
the following: "prospects of quick but unmerited career advancement; political
appointment of a nominee of the judge; immediate financial gains; fear of job
insecurity; or even membership of the same secret society with one of the parties to
the dispute." Deson Abali, Nigeria: Corruption in the Judiciary, THISDAY (Lagos)
(June 23, 2003), quoted in Oko, supra note 12, at 30 n.99. Whatever the
justification, corrupt practices come with negative consequences for judicial
independence as analyzed above. See supra notes 238-43 and corresponding texts
(discussing the factors that make corruption inefficient).
266. See Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform in China: Recent Developments and
Future Prospects,36 INT'L L. 1039, 1057 (2002) (stating that judicial corruption has
the capacity of "turn[ing] the rule of law [in]to a rule of individuals pursuing their
private interests," among a range of other negative consequences, down to
destabilization of the social order).
267. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, EvaluatingJuries by Comparison to Judges,
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 469-509 (2005) (comparing and contrasting the jury trial
and bench systems in the United States).
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cases involving protection of rights, 268 and places them in a position
"to influence the outcome of cases,"269 which can be detrimental to
litigants who are not powerful or politically connected.
2. (Un) Speedy Trials
Nigeria's constitution provides for a fair trial within a reasonable
time.2 70 It explicitly requires judges to deliver judgment within ninety
days after conclusion of evidence and final address by counsel. 2 7'
Despite these requirements, speedy trials remain a rare judicial
occurrence in Nigeria. Instead, "there is hardly any case which is
heard with any real degree of urgency or desire to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution." 2 72 Undue delay remains an obstacle
for parties who seek to do business with or via Nigerian courts. 2 73
Nigerian courts should be given the tools they need to conduct
speedy trials within the time frame under the constitution. This
includes adding spacious courtrooms, maintaining a steady power
supply, hiring properly-trained interpreters, and providing adequate
law libraries and access to computers, photocopiers, stationeries,
stenographic services, transcript services, audio, slide, and other visual
equipment. These tools should also include opportunities for
continuing education for judges and judicial staff. Armed with these

268. Oko, supra note 12, at 29 n.96 (quoting former Nigerian Supreme Court
Justice Philip Nnaemeka-Agu).
269. Id. at 29.
270.

CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 36,

§ 1 ("In the

determination of his civil rights and obligations, . . . a person shall be entitled to a
fair hearing within a reasonable time by the court or other tribunal established by
law and constituted in such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.").
271. Id. art. 291, § 1 (stipulating that "[e]very court established under this
Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the
conclusion of evidence and final addresses"). The Nigerian Supreme Court
interpreted this provision in Egbo v. Agbara [1997], 1 N.W.L.R. 293 (Nigeria). In
that case, the court decided that failure to deliver a judgment within the 90-day
period is not fatal where the case is entirely documentary or rests mainly on
interpretation of some document and the credibility or demeanor of witnesses is not
at issue. Id. For a complaint to succeed in these cases, the complainant must
"establish that the delay occasioned a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 316.
272. Oko, supra note 12, at 40.
273. See id. at 39-40.
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basic facilities, Nigerian courts will be more able to provide litigants
who use their services fair and speedy trials. As the famous aphorism
goes, justice delayed is justice denied. Just as the post office in
Nigeria has a notoriety for uninviting face, as far as one can
remember, Nigerian courts have an equally dubious reputation for
their "come today, come tomorrow" syndrome, wrapped in a culture
of repeated adjournments.2 74
D. Building JudicialIndependence with PublicParticipation
Public participation in building judicial independence is at the
heart of this article and is a measure that builds logically and
imperceptibly on the preceding four steps. Given the willing support
of the political branches and contributions of the judicial branch that
staves off corruption and eschews un-speedy judgment, is there
anything else left to ensure judicial independence and promote the rule
of law? The answer is unequivocally yes. The missing element is
public participation. Because judicial independence and the rule of
law are a collective good, the public must contribute its part to help
bring them about.2 75 More specifically, public participation here
274. See Alewo M. Agbonika, Delay in the Administration of CriminalJustice
in Nigeria: Issues from a Nigerian Viewpoint, 26 J. L., POL'Y, & GLOBALIZATION
130, 134 (2014) (indicating that some judges "even adjourn cases arbitrarily to go
and pick children from school"). See Iruoma 0. Obiokoye, EradicatingDelay in the
Administration of Justice in African Courts: A Comparative Analysis of South
African and Nigerian Courts (Oct. 31, 2005) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation,
University of Pretoria), http://www.repository.up.ac.za/handle/2263/942, for a
comparative study of South African and Nigerian courts, integrating proposals on
how to minimize delay in the administration of justice in the two court systems.
275. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Court with a View: Building Judicial
Independence with Public Participation,8 WILLIAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DiSP. RESOL.
13 (2000) (arguing that the basic, underlying safeguard for judicial independence is
popular support of the concept). The public is defined here to include civil society,
the non-governmental portion of society, such as non-government-controlled mass
media, labor groups, human rights groups, environmental organizations, religious
organizations and the like. See JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL

HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999) (examining the historical, political, and theoretical
evolution regarding the understanding of civil society going back to the second half
of the eighteenth century). See also MARK E. EGBE, THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
IN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI

PEOPLE (MOSOP) (2004) (applying the term in its intersection with the government,
using a Nigerian self-determination group as case study).
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stands for what one U.S. jurist called "building judicial independence
with public participation," 27 6 a notion different from and more deepseated than merely adding the contribution of the public in the
struggle for judicial independence. Building judicial independence
with public participation refers to "the public's willingness to support
and fight for judicial independence." 277 It is a willingness that hinges
on the public's "understanding of, and trust and confidence in the
judicial system." 278 The greater the understanding and confidence, the
more likely it is that the public will fight for judicial independence.
Contrarily, "a public that does not trust its judges to exercise evenhanded judgment" is less likely to fight for judicial independence. 279
Instead, it "will look upon judicial independence as a problem to be

eradicated." 2 80
The deduction from this understanding is that progress on the road
to judicial independence in Nigeria and elsewhere is paved by two
means: first, increased public understanding of the judicial system;
and second, increased public confidence in the judicial system. One
way to achieve the first is through education, both formally in schools
and informally through enlightenment campaigns on the utility of
judicial independence. It is probably this goal of enlightenment that
the drafters of the Ugandan constitution sought to achieve when they
wrote in the document that "U]udicial power is derived from the
people," 281 and that the people shall participate "in the administration

276. Abrahamson, supra note 275 (maintaining that judicial independence
must be underpinned by popular support of the concept).
277. Id. at 24. See also Abrahamson, supra note 33, at 982 (arguing that
judicial independence protects the people, not judges); Bobby R. Baldock et al.,
Feature:JudicialIndependence: A Discussion ofJudicialIndependence with Judges
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 74 DENV. U. L. REv.
355, 362 (1997) (pointing out that "[w]hile a judge must follow and adhere to the
law, judges, like everyone else, watch the news and are aware of public sentiment").
278. Abrahamson, supra note 275, at 24.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 24.
281.

CONSTITUTION

OF THE REPUBLIC

OF UGANDA

(2005),

art.

126,

http://www.opm.go.ug/assets/media/resources/6/Constitution.pdf.
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of justice by the courts."2 82
At the opposite end, Nigeria's
constitution contains no equivalent language. 2 83
Similar to the Uganda constitution, it is the same imperative that
Professors Berman and Murphy had in mind when, regarding the U.S.,
they stated, "[i]n the end, the [judiciary's] greatest protection from
political threats to its independence has always come from the people
themselves," cognizant of the instrumentalist value of judicial
independence for securing their civil rights and liberties as well as a
parameter of true democracy. 2 84 Justice Stephen G. Breyer of the U.S.
Supreme Court expressed a similar opinion, stating, "[t]he greatest
threat to an independent judicial branch is citizens who are unaware of
what judges do or why [judges] should be independent."2 85 If the
public is aware of the duties judges have and if they are aware of why
judges should be independent, he said, "[t]hey're likely to protect
[judicial independence for them]."2 8 6
In addition to increasing the public's understanding of judicial
independence, the public must also have increased confidence in the
judiciary. Such increased confidence comes about when the public

282. Id. art. 127.
283. Unlike the Ugandan Constitution, the most Nigeria's 1999 Constitution
did was vest judicial powers on the constitutional courts the document enumerated
in article 6, section 5. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 6, §
1, art. 6, § 5.
284. BERMAN & MURPHY, supra note 20, at 188. The condition attached to
this public support, Berman and Murphy indicated, is that the justices must be
"careful not to outpace public opinion in their decisions." Id. Civil rights are
guarantees "derive[d] largely from the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment[,]" that protect citizens "against discrimination because of
characteristics, such as gender, race, ethnicity, or disability." Id. at 446. Civil
liberties are guarantees "to every U.S. citizen by the Bill of Rights and the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[J" such as freedom of speech and
religion, and safeguards for accused persons, such as the right to a speedy and public
trial by an impartial jury. See id. at 446 (defining civil liberties); id. at 424-34
(discussing the rights of defendants under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
285. DVD: A Conversation on the Constitution: Judicial Branch, Sunnylands
Seminar-The Judicial Branch (Stephen G. Breyer, The Annenberg Foundation
Trust at Sunnylands, 2006), www.AnnenbergClassroom.org
[hereinafter
Conversation on the U.S. Constitution] (emphasis added).
286. Id. (emphasis added).
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perceives that judges are able to "exercise even-handed judgment," 2 87
by administering justice fairly and impartially. 28 8 It does not mandate
that all judicial decisions be wise or that all judicial behavior be
impeccable; instead what it requires is that "within the limits of
ordinary human frailty," the judicial system pursues faithfully values
like impartiality, integrity, and professionalism. 289 Whichever form
that confidence manifests itself, the Nigerian public does not currently
have it. To the contrary, there is a widespread perception in the
country that "judges are easily bribed," 290 as well as that "the judiciary
is unable to constrain abuse of power and administer justice fairly and

impartially." 2 9 1
After General Babangida annulled the presidential election in
1993, which would have ushered in the Third Republic, the Nigerian
masses organized a resistance movement against military rule in the
country. 292 Made up of pro-democracy and human rights activist
groups, this resistance movement led to the downfall of Babangida's
regime, and ultimately paved the way for the Fourth Republic after
General Abacha's death in 1998.293 Fifteen years into the Fourth
Republic, Nigerians need a mass movement of equal proportion to
install judicial independence and its attendant culture of the rule of
law in the country. One commentator has poignantly observed that
many of the efforts to clean up the judicial system in many African
countries "have borne little fruit because the politicians have found it
287. Abrahamson, supra note 275, at 24.
288. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurther, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Supreme Court's authority "ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction").
289. Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of Australia, Address at the Judicial
Conference of Australia in Launceston: "Public Confidence in the Judiciary" (Apr.
27, 2002), http://www.hcourt.gov/au/speeches/cj/cj-ica.htm.
290. COUNTRY REPORT 2003: NIGERIA, supra note 142.
291. Oko, supra note 12, at 46. At the very least, Nigerians have a tendency
"to view with caution the role of the courts as impartial dispensers of justice." Id. at
30.
292.

See RITA KIKI EDOZIE, PEOPLE POWER AND DEMOCRACY: THE POPULAR

MOVEMENT AGAINST MILITARY DESPOTISM IN NIGERIA, 1989-1999 (2002)
(analyzing the activities of various groups within the Nigerian pre-democracy
movement from 1989 to 1999 that resisted the annulment of the 1993 presidential
election).
293. See id.
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more convenient to have a crooked and malleable judiciary than an
independent one." 294 In similar fashion and using their popular
power, 295 the masses should insist on political office holders pushing
through the reforms that are necessary to bring about judicial
independence in Nigeria. 29 6
Unfortunately, ordinary citizens are an integral part of the "culture
of corruption" which marks daily life in many parts of Nigeria.2 97 The
public should see that the only good judgments (or lawsuits) are the
ones not purchased through acts of corruption, such as bribing judges.
Given the negative outcome corrupt acts impose on society, 29 8 they
should see that judgments secured through foul means are not
judgments at all. For litigants who fail to get the message, the
government should increase the cost of devious judgments secured via
corrupt means through more vigorous enforcement of anti-corruption
laws that for long have sat dormant and mostly unenforced. Judges
should also be compensated adequately to minimize the temptation of
resorting to corrupt means using their judicial offices.

294. CALDERISI, supra note 205, at 89.
295. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 21(3) (stating that "[t]he will of the
people," "expressed in periodic and genuine elections" shall form the basis of
governmental authority).
296. Similar popular commitment is necessary in a political system to
maintain practices that promote judicial independence, such as constitutional
democracy. Professor Sodaro indicated that the people must want democracy and be
willing to make sacrifices to bring it about, and must agree to make democracy "the
only game in town," rather than, for example, imagine replacing democracy with
authoritarianism. SODARO, supra note 9, at 221 (commenting on the conditions for
democracy). In the same vein, Justice Anthony Kennedy of the U.S. Supreme Court
asserted: "The Constitution is not automatic. It doesn't go on automatic pilot. It runs
because you believe in it, because you understand it, because you support it, because
you want it. That's the only thing that makes it work." Anthony M. Kennedy, in
Conversation on the U.S. Constitution, supra note 285.
297. SMITH, supra note 229 (portraying a society riddled with the scourge of
corruption in which ordinary citizens are willing or unwilling participants at every
turn).
298. See supra notes 238-43 and corresponding texts (analyzing the factors
that make corruption inefficient).
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E. JudicialReforms on Several Fronts
Insanity is defined as the repeated engagement of the same
activity and expecting different results. 299 To avoid the same
practices that lead to the same negative results in the judicial branch,
Nigeria needs bold and persistent experimentation coupled with a
willingness to adapt with respect to judicial reforms. 300 It is necessary
to define judicial reforms broadly, mindful of the World Bank's
advice that, to be helpful, reform should be comprehensive rather than
piecemeal palliatives that do not go far enough. 30 1 So defined,
judicial reforms are changes for society that emanate from the judicial
system. With these guidelines in mind, the list that follows illustrates,
but does not exhaust, the numerous possibilities. 302
299. See Cara Santa Maria, Insanity: The Real Definition, HUFF. POST (Dec.
20,
2011),
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/20/insanity-definition-n_1159
927.html (attributing the statement to the U.S. physicist Albert Einstein (18791955)).
300. The inspiration for this thought came from a commentary by Fareed
Zakaria regarding the seeming decline of U.S. global power. See Fareed Zakaria,
Are America's Best Days Behind Us?, TIME
(Mar.
3, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2056723-1,00.html.
(last
visited Dec. 15, 2014). Zakaria decried the "kind of unreflective ancestor worship"
that appears to have taken hold of the American mind. Id. Those who wrote the U.S.
Constitution, he said, were individuals who "constantly adapt[ed] their views"; they
were versed in the favorite American pastime of "contemplating decay" and
thinking "a great deal about decline" when things are still going well. Id. He opined
that this state of mind stimulated the type of innovative reforms that had kept the
U.S. globally competitive. Id. In short, the framers of the U.S. Constitution were
individuals who advised "bold, persistent experimentation," always aware that
America "was a work in progress, an unfinished enterprise that would constantly be
in need of change, adjustment, and repair." Id. Nigeria needs the same "bold,
persistent experimentation" in pursuing reforms in the judicial branch and other
areas of its national life.
301. See Douglas Webb, Legal and Institutional Reform Strategy and
Implementation:A World Bank Perspective, 30 LAW. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 161, 16162 (1999).
302. Much of the discussion that follows is inspired by Ogunye, supra note 12.
Ogunye is a private legal practitioner in Lagos, Nigeria, who proposed that the
Nigerian National Assembly establish a five-member Judicial Reform Commission
composed of five eminent jurists who will sit for four months. Id. at 3. The
Commission would be tasked with the responsibility of reviewing all the different
steps taken over the years of the Fourth Republic to reform the judiciary at both the
federal and state levels-specifically challenges, such as structural, operational,
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The first is fiscal autonomy discussed earlier in this article.3 03
Unlike Nigeria's 1979 constitution, the 1999 Constitution introduced
centralized control of the Nigerian judiciary. 304 The second reform
therefore would be to decentralize judicial control by transferring back
to state courts responsibilities improperly and inappropriately
concentrated in the federal judiciary. 30 5 One such power needing
devolution is the high court's unlimited jurisdiction, which belonged
to the states under the 1979 constitution, but under the 1999
Constitution is assigned to the federal high court. 306
A third judicial reform focuses on the need to minimize the
negative effect of "federal character" to change the manner in which
this principle has been applied in the federal judiciary. 30 7 Distorted
application of this principle has resulted in the appointment to the
bench of some individuals "demonstrably ill-qualified to serve as

ethical, funding, and staffing of the judiciary. Id. The Commission would then make
recommendations to the National Assembly on steps needed to increase the
efficiency of the Nigerian Judiciary. Id. at 2, 5-6.
303. See supra Part III.A.
304. Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 139, at 250 n.93.
305. Ogunye, supra note 12, at 4.
306. Id.
307. One of the important innovations of the 1979 constitution is the "federal
character" doctrine, which mandates that the composition of the national
government or any of its constituent agencies "shall reflect the federal character of
Nigeria," such that "there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or
from a few ethnic or other sectional groups" in that government or agency. See
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 14, § 3. The same principle
applies at the other two levels in the Nigerian federal system, namely: states and
local governments. See id. art. 14, § 4. The principle is a noble idea that,

unfortunately, has been implemented in a manner that promotes "quota," or, as the
U.S. Supreme Court would say in its affirmative action jurisprudence, not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka,
Affirmative Action and the Black Experience in America, 36 HUM. RTS. 8 (2009)
(discussing the experience of African Americans regarding affirmative action
programs); Philip C. Aka, The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action in Public
Education, with Special Reference to the Michigan Cases, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.
J. 1 (2006) (analyzing affirmative action, focusing on two cases in 2003 involving

the University of Michigan); Philip C. Aka, Assessing the Impact of the Supreme
Court Decision in Grutter on the Use of Race in Law School Admissions, 42 CAL.
W. L. REV. 1 (2005) (confining the assessment of affirmative action to law school
admissions).
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judges." 3 08 The challenge is to create a more "credible appointment
and promotion system" where "cronyism and dynastic succession" are
not the norm. 309
Under the 1999 Constitution, the Supreme Court is comprised of a
panel of five or more justices, out of the complement of twenty-one
justices. 3 10 As a fourth reform, this practice needs to give way to a
system that allows for the full court to determine each and every
matter that comes before it, 3 1 1 or at least nine justices, as is the
practice in the U.S. The idea behind this change is to make the
Court's decisions more meaningful while increasing the public's
respect for a judiciary that, due to corruption concerns, the public
tends to view with caution. 3 12
Fifth, to reduce the caseload of the Supreme Court, Nigeria should
consider creating a constitutional court that is separate and distinct
from the present Supreme Court. This constitutional court would
handle matters of original jurisdiction relating to the constitution,
including disputes between the national government and a state,
among the states, or between the National Assembly and any other
branch of government. This would allow the Supreme Court to focus
on appellate matters. 3 13 A possible model for such a court can be the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, which was established with the
onset of majority rule in 1994, and is comprised of eleven
members. 314 Nigeria currently has too many members on the
Supreme Court. The twenty-one members on the current Supreme
Court would be nearly enough for two courts of eleven members each.
Sixth, since the NJC is charged with the responsibility of
disciplining judges, it may need to be re-composed or re-configured so
that there are no active judicial officers on it. Instead, the Council

308. Oko, supra note 12, at 50.
309. Ogunye, supra note 12, at 4.
310.

CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999), supra note 60, art. 234.

311. Ogunye, supra note 12, at 6.
312. Oko, supra note 12, at 30.
313. Ogunye, supra note 12, at 6.
314.

See THEUNIS RouX, THE POLITICS OF PRINCIPLE: THE FIRST SOUTH

AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, 1995-2005 (2013). On the jurisprudence of the
court, see THE DIGNITY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH

AFRICA: CASES AND MATERIALS (Drucilla Cornell et al., eds., vols. I and 2 2013).
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should comprise only retired judicial officers. 3 15 This would allow the
Council to perform its duties more competently and credibly.
Last but not least, there is need to reduce the expansive role of the
Chief Justice of Nigeria ("CJN") in the judicial system. Under the
1999 Constitution, the CJN heads the Supreme Court, the NJC, the
National Judicial Institute, the Federal Judicial Service Commission,
and the Legal Practitioners Privileges Committee ("LPPC").3 16 As one
Nigerian legal practitioner thoughtfully points out, these powers may
be "too enormous" in a manner that makes them "prone to despotic
abuse." 317 For example, the NJC is vested with responsibility of
disciplinary action over all judicial officers in Nigeria, including
justices who sit with the Chief Justice on the Supreme Court. 18
Furthermore, the CJN has the exclusive power under the Nigerian
Constitution to appoint fourteen out of the nineteen members of the
Council. 3 19 This occurrence raises the troubling question of whether
such a body "so dictatorially composed" can be independent of the

Chief Justice. 320
CONCLUSION

Under the checkered years of its Fourth Republic, 32 1 Nigeria has
made important strides in judicial independence. But the country still
has a long way to go to reach the haven of full judicial independence
and political culture rooted in the rule of law. The road to that
experience will be paved by commitment comprised of key steps that
include support from the political branches, contributions from the
judiciary itself, broad-based judicial reforms, and public support, all of
which are predicated on the maintenance of civil-democratic rule.
315. See Ogunye, supra note 12, at 6.
316. Id. at 5. The LPPC makes the decision regarding who has the distinction
of Senior Advocate of Nigeria ("SAN"), considered the equivalent of the Queen's
Counsel in the U.K., and the CJN appoints eleven out of the fifteen total members of
this SAN-award Committee. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 8.
319. Id. at 9.
320. Id.
321. See supra Part IV. (analyzing two factors of Nigerian politics under the
Fourth Republic since 1999 with possible implications for judicial independence). .

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol45/iss1/2

74

Aka: Judicial Independence under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Problems

74

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

Key among these factors will be the public's willingness to fight
for judicial independence. Attaining judicial independence in Nigeria
will require a mass movement similar to the one that successfully
challenged military rule during the 1990s and paved the way for the
return of democracy and creation of the Fourth Republic. Even so, the
legacies of authoritarian military rule run deep in Nigeria. 32 2 The
disabilities from military rule are proving more difficult to overcome
than initially thought, even for the branch of the government that
never experienced disbandment during the thirty long years of military
rule. 323
There are two questions addressed in this conclusion: first,
whether Nigeria should prioritize the factors in Part V. or pursue those
factors simultaneously; and second, the comparative value of this
article. As to the first question, the main point against prioritization is
that given the complexity of the country and unpredictability or
enigma of its leaders, one does not know which strategy would work
for Nigeria's long-suffering citizenry. The idea for this prioritization
was inspired by an arguably far-fetched source with little relationship

322. See generally Obiagwu & Odinkalu, supra note 139, at 235-36 (ranking
military rule as one of two obstacles impeding human rights in Nigeria).
323.

See, e.g., JOHN MCCORMICK, COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN TRANSITION 417

(7th ed. 2013) (observing that "[m]ilitary governments typically suspend political
parties, abolish civilian political institutions, and sometimes use military tribunals,
but they usually allow the courts to continue functioning, and even use them to
underpin the return to civilian rule"). This is an insight inspired by Rotimi Suberu's
article on the Supreme Court and federalism in Nigeria. See Suberu, supra note 12,
at 451-85. Suberu analyzed fifteen federal-state cases over off-shore oil resources,
revenue allocation, local governance, and public order, that the court decided
between March 2002 and March 2007. See id. at 60-61, Table I (names of these
cases). My take from the cases is of a court so cautious in its jurisprudence, it can be
justifiably called "free but timid": coming out of its shell, taking advantage of the
freer atmosphere made possible by civilian rule, yet psychologically withdrawn as in
the days of military rule. Suberu observed that "[a] remarkable feature" of the
Nigerian experiment with civilian rule in the eight years from 1999 to 2007 that it
reviewed "was the independent and relatively balanced role of the Supreme Court in
arbitrating a succession of inter-governmental conflicts in the federation." Id. at 482.
"Essentially, the Court validated the country's highly centralized, military-inspired,
federal Constitution." Id. at 483. But Suberu appeared to set the bar low, stating that
"[m]ost remarkably, in most of its decisions, the Court did not fracture internally
along ethnic, regional or sectarian lines." Id.
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to judicial independence. 324 For optimum results, judicial reforms in
Nigeria need to be synergized with several factors occurring
simultaneously. This also fits in with the advice of the World Bank
that, in order to be effective, legal reforms need to be comprehensive
rather than piecemeal.3 2 5
Turning to the second question, this work has the comparative
utility adverted to in the introduction. 326 Nigeria is a microcosm of
Africa that reflects the cleavages of every dimension-ethnic,
religious, regional, and class-with ramifications for conflicts that rile
the continent.3 27 Judicial independence offers one way out of the
problem and Nigeria, as the largest society in Africa, provides a
valuable comparative lesson for many countries in the region,
especially those with similar history that are riven by conflicts. 328 A
second factor that lends this article comparative merit, a point easily
glossed over in the literature, is the attention that it draws to judicial
independence as a tool for conflict management in Africa.329
Moreover, governmental accountability has little meaning where the

324. See M. NIGHT SHYAMALAN, I GOT SCHOOLED: THE UNLIKELY STORY OF
HOW A MOONLIGHTING MOVIE MAKER LEARNED THE FIVE KEYS TO CLOSING

AMERICA'S EDUCATION GAP 197-98 (2013) (discussing America's education gap
between white and non-white children that worsens during the summer holidays).
325. See Webb, supra note 301, at 161-62.
326. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
327.

See OLADIMEJi ABORISADE & ROBERT J. MUNDT, POLITICS IN NIGERIA

xi-xii (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that "[n]either Nigeria nor any other country can
stand for all of Africa, for Africa is marked by great diversity. Still, if to know
Nigeria is not necessarily to know Africa, it is a good place to begin, for there will
be little that is surprising in politics elsewhere on the continent to one who is well
acquainted with the Nigerian experience.").
328. See id.
329. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka, Human Rights as Conflict Resolution in Africa in
the New Century, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179 (2003) (focusing on improved
human rights as tool for lasting conflict resolution in Africa). But the condition of
inadequate treatment in the literature on the role of judicial independence in conflict
management is changing. See, e.g., THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Andreas Schedler et al., eds. 1999)

(including judicial independence among factors that help to restrain the state and
produce accountability for the use of power in new democracies that include those in
Africa).
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judiciary lacks independence, hence the attention to "building judicial
independence" as an accountability tool in some African countries. 330

330. Jennifer Widner, Building Judicial Independence in Commonwealth
Africa in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW

DEMOCRACIES 177-93 (focusing on Tanzania).
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APPENDICES

A.

NIGERIAN CHIEF JUSTICES FROM 1958 TO THE PRESENT 33 '

Name
Adetokunbo Ademola
Taslim 0. Elias
Darnley A. Alexander
Atanda F. Williams
George S. Sowemimo
Ayo G. Irikefe
Mohammed Bello
Muhammad L. Uwais
Salihu M.A. Belgore
Idris L. Kutigi
Aloysius I. Katsina-Alu
Dahiru Musdapher
Aloma M. Mukhtar
Mahmud Mohammed

Period in office
1958-1972
1972-1975
1975-1979
1979-1983
1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1995
1995-2006
2006-2007
2007-2009
2009-2011
2011-2012
2012-2014
2014-present

331. See List of Chief Justices of Nigeria, FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE
COMMISSION, http://fjsconline.gov.ng/listof chife.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2015);
Mahmud Mohammed: The new ChiefJustice ofNigeria, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Nov.
26, 2014), http://dailyindependentnig.com/2014/11/ mahmud-mohammed-newchief-justice-nigeria/.
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B. AGENCIES TIED TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA33 2

Agency

Foundational

Function

Instrument

Federal Judicial
Service
Commission

1999 Constitution

National
Judicial Council

1999 Constitution

National
Judicial
Institute

1991 Military Order

Makes
recommendations on
issues relating to the
appointment and
removal of national
judges
Makes
recommendations
relating to the discipline
of judges
Promotes efficiency,
uniformity, and
effectiveness of judicial
services in the country,
including continuing
education for

judges

332. See About Us, FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION,
http://www.fjsconline.gov.ng/aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2015); About the
Council, NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL NIGERIA, http://njc.gov.ng/about.php (last
visited Jan. 10, 2015); National Judicial Institute, NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE,
http://nji.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/profile (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
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